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INDIANA'S PATTERSON RULE OF EVIDENCE:
ITS EVOLUTION, MISAPPLICATION
AND CORRECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The traditional hearsay rule prohibits out-of-court statements
from being introduced into evidence to prove the truth-of-the-facts
asserted.' Indiana abandoned its adherence to the traditional evidence
rule in Patterson v. State2 when it permitted a witness' prior out-of-
court statements to be admitted into evidence to prove the facts thus
asserted.3 As Indiana relaxed its restrictions on hearsay, federal courts
simultaneously implemented formal rules, which in part related to
restricting prior out-of-court statements made by witnesses.4 Indiana's
Patterson hearsay rule has therefore become one of the most liberal
evidentiary rules in the United States today by allowing the virtual-
ly unrestricted admission of prior out-of-court statements into
evidence.5 The Patterson rule requires reform so that it will effective-
1. When a statement is used to prove the "truth-of-the-facts-asserted," it is
utilized to show that the content of the out-of-court statement is true rather than
simply verifying that the prior statement was made. See C. MCMORMICK, MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE S 251 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
2. 263 Ind. 55, 324 N.E.2d 482 (1975).
3. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at S 251. McCormick states that "the traditional
view is that a prior statement of a witness is hearsay if offered to prove the happen-
ing of matters asserted therein. . . .[T]he prior statement is admissible as proof of
the matters asserted therein, i.e. 'substantive' evidence, only when falling within one
of the exceptions to the hearsay rule." Id. at 601.
4. The Patterson rule was handed down March 18, 1975. The Federal Rules
of Evidence, 28 U.S.C. App. (1976), were approved by Congress on January 2, 1975.
The effective date of the rules was July 1, 1975. FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(1)(A) and (B)
restricted the admission of both prior inconsistent and prior consistent statements.
See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
5. Only a minority of states other than Indiana have abandoned the tradi-
tional hearsay rule. Those states include California, Kansas, New Jersey, New Mexico
and Oregon. These five states have accepted some from of FED. R. EVID. 801 to limit
the admissibility of hearsay statements. These counterparts to the Federal Rules are
found in CAL. EVID. CODE S 1236 (West Supp. 1982), KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 60-460 (1982 Supp.),
N.J. R. EVID. 63(1) (1967), N.M. STAT. ANN. S 801(d)(1) (1983). The Oregon evidentiary rules
have not yet been codified. Other states instituting liberal hearsay rules include Ken-
tucky, North Carolina, South Carolina and Wisconsin. Examples of their non-traditional
hearsay rules can be found in Phillips v. Common wealth, - Ky.- 600 S.W.2d
485 (1980), State v. Satterfield, __ N.C. App.-., 218 S.E.2d 504 (1975), State v.
Huggins, - S.C. - , 269 S.E.2d 334 (1980), and Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 230,
163 N.W.2d 609 (1969). These states have not adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence
but many have imposed safeguards to ensure the reliability of out-of-court statements.
See infra notes 268-78 and accompanying text.
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ly prohibit unreliable hearsay from being introduced as substantive
evidence.
The Patterson rule is a significant departure from Indiana's tradi-
tional rule of evidence. Patterson permits prior out-of-court statements
made by a witness or party to be admitted into substantive evidence
notwithstanding the fact there are no safeguards ensuring the
reliability of the statement at the time it is originally made. In con-
trast to the traditional rules of evidence, under Patterson the declarant
need not be under oath when the statement is first elicited. There
is also no requirement that the declarant be subject to cross examina-
tion at the time the out-of-court statement was made. The only Pat-
terson prerequisite to the admission of the prior out-of-court state-
ment into evidence is that the declarant must be available at trial
for cross examination.'
A liberal hearsay rule, such as the rule established in Patterson,
creates a problem of insuring the reliability of the out-of-court
statement.! To remedy the reliability problem, Patterson placed one
restriction upon extrajudicial statements that were introduced in court
as substantive evidence. That restriction required that the out-of-court
declarant must be available in court for cross examination!
Indiana courts quickly recognized that merely requiring the
declarant's availability for cross examination was not sufficient to
safeguard the reliability of the statement.' The Indiana Court of Ap-
peals imposed several criteria that had to be met before the Patter-
son rule could be utilized."0 Most of these safeguards have not been
considered by the Indiana Supreme Court. Consequently, their validity
is somewhat tenuous."
The Indiana Supreme Court has not been as a active as the courts
of appeals in establishing limitations to the Patterson rule. The
Supreme Court of Indiana has added only one restriction to the Pat-
terson rule since the rule was established. That court construed the
Patterson rule as prohibiting the use of out-of-court statements as a
6. Patterson, 263 Ind. at 58, 324 N.E.2d at 484-85.
7. Hearsay is prohibited due to fear that the out-of-court asserter is not credi-
ble. Without proper safeguards, the more hearsay statements that are allowed into
evidence, the greater the chance that unreliable evidence will be introduced into court.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at S 245.
8. Patterson, 263 Ind. at 58, 324 N.E.2d at 484-85.
9. See infra notes 186-214 and accompanying text.
10. Id.
11. See infra note 197.
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substitute for available in-court testimony. 2 Prior to adding that limita-
tion, the Indiana Supreme Court permitted the Patterson rule to be
used to substitute out-of-court statements for more reliable in-court
testimony.13 It overruled that prior decision to ensure that reliable
evidence will be introduced into trial.
1 4
The Indiana Supreme Court's restrictions on the admissibility
of out-of-court statements are not sufficient to guarantee the reliability
and credibility of hearsay before it is introduced into substantive
evidence. The failure of the Indiana Supreme Court to restrict the
rule to prevent unreliable hearsay from being introduced has resulted
in prior statements being admitted without being effectively challenged
by cross-examination. 1 Cross-examination is the only safeguard of
statement reliability provided for in the Patterson rule."8 Therefore,
admitting into evidence out-of-court statements that cannot be effec-
tively cross-examined permits hearsay evidence to be introduced at
trial without any assurance of reliability. This is precisely the prob-
lem the traditional hearsay rule effectively prevented.
The Patterson rule is problematic in its application and because
it creates opportunities for hearsay abuse. The rule contains no
safeguard against manufactured prior statements,'8 jury overvaluation
of out-of-court statements, 9 irrelevant out-of-court statements,2 or
statements that do not lend themselves to effective cross examination.2
Under the Patterson rule, unnecessary and unreliable statements may
be admitted in court as substantive evidence.
In order to ensure the jury's receipt of reliable evidence, Indiana
12. Samuels v. State, 267 Ind. 676, 372 N.E.2d 1186 (1978). In Samuels, the
Patterson rule was limited to prevent the admission of out-of-court statements that
had previously been allowed under Flewallen v. State, 267 Ind. 90, 368 N.E.2d 239 (1977).
13. Flewallen v. State, 267 Ind. 90, 368 N.E.2d 239 (1977).
14. Samuels, 267 Ind. at 677, 372 N.E.2d at 1187. This decision, which creates
the only limitation established upon the Patterson rule since its inception, was authorized
by Justice Prentice who also wrote the original Patterson decision.
15. See infra notes 224-42 and accompanying text.
16. Patterson, 263 Ind. at 58, 324 N.E.2d at 484. In Patterson, the court held
that the out-of-court declarant's availability for cross-examination is the safeguard of
paramount importance and is adequate to ensure reliability.
17. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 602. The traditional hearsay rule pro-
hibited out-of-court assertions from being used as substantive evidence. This rule had
the effect of preventing unreliable evidence from being introduced into evidence.
18. See infra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 257 and accompany text.
20. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 224-42 and accompanying text.
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must reform the Patterson rule. Certain minimal prerequisites should
be added to the Patterson rule if Indiana is to continue permitting
out-of-court statements to be introduced as substantive evidence.' The
Patterson rule should be modified to include requisite criteria which
out-of-court statements must meet before they may be introduced in-
to evidence.23 Extrajudicial statements should not be admissible for
the sole purpose of bolstering in-court testimony. A declarant should
be required to testify in court about the subject matter of the state-
ment and affirm its veracity before the statement is admitted into
evidence.25 Finally, the statement should pass all the admissibility re-
quirements of in-court testimony, including the necessity of first hand
knowledge.' These prerequisites are essential to ensure the relevancy
of the out-of-court statements and guarantee the declarant's availability
for effective cross examination, thereby promoting the statements'
reliability.
As a final safeguard to prevent unreliable hearsay from finding
its way into substantive evidence, the trial court should be given
discretion to restrict unreliable and highly prejudicial out-of-court
statements even if the proposed prerequisites are met.' The trial court
should impose a balancing test upon out-of-court statements to deter-
mine whether the value of the hearsay outweighs its negative effects.
Such judicial scrutiny will act as a continuous safeguard against new
methods of introducing unreliable prejudicial substantive evidence
before the jury.
II. THE HISTORY OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE, 1500-1975
A historical perspective of hearsay will provide a proper
analytical framework for the proposed reforms of Indiana's current
evidentiary law. The traditional evidentiary rules concerning hearsay
were developed very early in the common law. Juries first began to
receive evidence from in-court testimony of witnesses in 16th Cen-
tury England.' Initially, courts did not distinguish hearsay statements
22. See infra notes 188-207 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 287-98 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 295-97 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 298-99 and accompanying text.
28. 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE S 1364 (J. Chadbourn Rev. 1974). Prior to the 1500's,
jurors were able to collect evidence randomly throughout the town and talk with friends
of the parties to the litigation. Id.
[Vol. 18
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from in-court testimony and allowed both to be introduced into
evidence.' Throughout the 1500's and early 1600's, hearsay statements
were consistently received by courts over the opposing party's objec-
tion to their introduction." As the English common law developed in
the 1600's, trial judges began to note that hearsay statements were
often insufficient and questionable evidence. 1 Eventually, judges ex-
ercised their discretion and excluded some forms of hearsay.3" Exclu-
sion of hearsay statements from persons not called to testify in court
was part of the judicial doctrine developing between 1675 and 1690."
The English courts also considered hearsay statements insufficient
to create a foundation for a conclusion of fact and only allowed hear-
say statements to be used to confirm or corroborate other testimony.
In the early 1700's, the trend in England began to move toward
excluding hearsay altogether.3 ' By the mid 18th century, all hearsay
was deemed inadmissible and the new task confronting courts was
the establishment of specific exceptions to the hearsay prohibition. 6
The trend during early 19th century England was to admit prior con-
sistent statements made by the declarant after the credibility of the
declarant's testimony was attacked by the opposing party. However,
a witness' prior consistent statements elicited from direct examina-
tion were not allowed to be introduced as substantive evidence in
the case-in-chief. 37
Until 1953, United States federal courts and individual state
29. Id. at 17.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 18.
32. Id. at 18. The appreciation of the impropriety of using hearsay statements
of persons who did not testify steadily grew and eventually resulted in the exclusion
of some hearsay. See, e.g., Colledge's Trial, 8 How. St. Tr. 549, 603 (1681), in which
the attorney general himself, during a prosecution for seditious publication, stops a
prosecution witness from stating what the defendant printer said as to authority.
Another counsel for the prosecution later did the same, stating, "We must not permit
this for example's sake, to tell what others said." Id. at 628, cited in 5 WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 28, at 19 n.32.
33. 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE. supra note 28, at 18.
34. Id. at 19. Hearsay was allowed as a mere supplement to other good evidence
already admitted into evidence. See, e.g., Knox's Trial, 7 How. St. Tr. 763, 790 (1679),
cited in 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE. supra note 28, at 19 n.33. (L.C.J. Scroggs: "The use
you make of [the witness' former statement] is no more but only to corroborate what
he hath said, that he told it to him while it was fresh and that it is no new matter
of his invention now.").
35. 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE. supra note 28, at 20.
36. Id.
37. Graham, Prior Consistent Statements: Rule 801 (d)(1)(b) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, Critique and Proposal, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 575, 578 (1979).
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courts followed the example established in England and staunchly pro-
hibited the introduction of consistent and inconsistent prior statements
into evidence to prove the truth-of-the-facts asserted. However, in 1953
the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 8 were adopted by the American Bar
Association and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws.' Uniform Rule 63(1) was a significant break from the tradi-
tional common law hearsay rule utilized at that time. Rule 63(1) ad-
mitted prior out-of-court statements as substantive evidence as long
as the declarant was present at the hearing and available for cross-
examination when the prior statement was admitted.0 However, states
didn't readily accept the Uniform Rules.41 States that did utilize
Uniform Rule 63(1) often attached severely limiting prerequisites to
it.42 Meanwhile, the vast majority of state and federal courts adhered
to the traditional hearsay policy of prohibiting prior statements from
being introduced in direct examination as substantive evidence in the
case-in-chief.
4
Indiana courts continued to follow the traditional view through
1974, prohibiting out-of-court statements from being admitted as
substantive evidence. Like other traditional hearsay jurisdictions,
38. UNIF. R. EVID. 63 (1953) is a direct counterpart to FED. R. EVID. 801. The
former deals with hearsay as follows: "Evidence of a statement which is made other
than by the witness while testifying at the hearing offered to prove the truth of the
matter stated is hearsay and inadmissible except: (1) Previous Statements of Persons
Present and Subject to Cross-Examination. A statement previously made by a person
who is present at the hearing and available for cross-examination with respect to the
statement and its subject matter, provided the statement would be admissible if made
by the declarant while testifying as a witness; . .." Id.
39. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS SIXTY-SECOND
YEAR, 161 (1953).
40. See supra note 38.
41. C. MCCORMICK. supra note.1, at 601, n.64.
42. See CAL. EVID. CODE S 1236 (West Supp. 1982). Accord N.J. R. EvID. 63 (1967).
43. See, e.g., Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 230, 233, 163 N.W.2d 609, 612 (1969)
("The general rule is almost universally recognized that evidence of extrajudicial
statements made by a witness who is not a party and whose declarations are not
binding as admissions is admissible only to impeach or discredit the witness, and is
not competent as substantive evidence of the facts to which such statements relate.").
California, Kansas, New Jersey, New Mexico and Oregon have abandoned the tradi-
tional hearsay rule excluding out-of-court statements from substantive evidence and
have adopted some form of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Indiana, Kentucky, North
Carolina, South Carolina and Wisconsin have not adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The remaining 40 states have essentially maintained the traditional rules of evidence.
See supra note 5.
44. See, e.g., Hogan v. State, 235 Ind. 271, 132 N.E.2d 908 (1956) (court re-
jected police officer's testimony about out-of-court statement he received from declarant
[Vol. 18
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they wanted to safeguard the jury from making a decision based upon
unreliable evidence. The courts persisted in demanding that a state-
ment be received in court as proof of the truth-of-the-facts asserted
only after that statement was made upon the witness stand, subject
to the test of cross-examination.' 5
Indiana and other traditional states which prohibited prior
statements from being used as substantive evidence stood in sharp
contrast to states with more liberal hearsay admission standards.'"
This disparity created the need for an established federal evidentiary
policy.4 17 In 1965, Congress authorized the formation of a Judicial Con-
ference headed by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court. 8 The purpose of this conference was to formulate suggestions
for new federal evidentiary rules that would create a federal stan-
dard for the use of evidence in federal courts. 9
Some members of the conference were concerned about the prob-
lems created by Uniform Rule 63(1), allowing all prior statements to
be admitted as substantive evidence as long as the declarant was
available for cross-examinationw The United States House of Represen-
who denied the veracity of statement at trial); Diblee v. State, 202 Ind. 571, 177 N.E.
261 (1931) (court prohibited police officer from testifying about the substance of pro-
secution's consistent out-of-court assertion); Parker v. State, 196 Ind. 534, 149 N.E.
59 (1925) (court prevented counsel from reading a refuted statement of admission to
witness in the jury's presence). See generally L. EWBANKS. A TREATISE ON THE RULES
OF EVIDENCE -TRIAL OF CASES, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL IN THE COURTS OF INDIANA (1902).
45. See Harvey v. State, 256 Ind. 473, 269 N.E.2d 759 (1971) See also 5
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 28, at S 1361.
46. See supra note 43.
47. Federal courts followed the traditional hearsay rules. Douglas v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 415 (1965) (court reversed conviction where prior out-of-court statement was
allowed into evidence and out-of-court declarant refused to testify on grounds of self-
incrimination). Accord Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1967) (court found it rever-
sible error to allow prior out-of-court statements to be read into evidence when witness
refused to be cross-examined on the statement-fact that witness conceded making
the prior statement did not change its inadmissibility). As more states abandoned the
traditional hearsay rule, federal courts came under increasing pressure to update their
evidentiary rules.
48. Congress authorized the creation of the Judicial Conference of the United
States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 331 (1966). The purpose of the Conference was to for-
mulate rules of evidence for the federal courts. S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051.
49. The Judicial Conference was given the job of establishing a firm eviden-
tiary policy independent of the rules of evidence followed by the states. Id.
50. COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES. H.R. DOC. No. 46, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
12 (1973) ("Not everyone agrees with Wigmore that 'Cross-examination is beyond doubt
the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discover of truth.' There needs to
1984]
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tatives was also concerned about the liberal position taken in the
Uniform Rules. The House placed firm restrictions upon the eviden-
tiary rule proposals submitted to its committee by the rules
conference. 1 These restrictions took the form of amendments which
were subsequently incorporated into the submitted rules. The House
amended the rules regarding the admissibility of prior out-of-court
statements, believing that safeguards were necessary to insure
reliability. To be admissible, the prior statement must have been given
both under oath and in a formal proceeding in which the declarant
was subject to cross-examination.
The Senate disagreed, believing that these severe limitations on
the admissibility of prior out-of-court statements were unnecessary.'
The declarant would be under oath as a witness during the trial when
he qualified or verified the prior statement thus satisfying the oath
requirement." Furthermore, the jury could observe the witness' de-
meanor at the time the subsequent statement was made and thereby
determine the witness' veracity.' Finally, the Senate stressed that
the witness would be on the stand and subject to cross-examination
regarding both the prior out-of-court statement and the in-court
statement.'
The merger of the Senate, House and Judiciary views on hear-
say evidence is manifested in the Federal Rules of Evidence, Article
be effective accomodation between oath, personal demeanor before the trier-of-fact,
and cross-examination to assure statement reliability.") [hereinafter cited as REPORT
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE].
51. H.R. REP No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 7051, 7086. In its discussion of Rule 801 (d)(1) as it applies to a witness' prior
inconsistent statements, the report stated that the "[R]ule as amended draws a distinc-
tion between types of prior inconsistent statements and allows only those made while
the declarant was subject to cross-examination at a trial or hearing or in a deposition,
to be admissible for their truth." Id. Prior to the House Report, the Judicial Con-
ference placed no restrictions upon prior out-of-court statements, not even the require-
ment of cross-examination. Id.
52. Id.
53. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 7051, 7062 ("The House severely limited the admissibility of prior inconsis-
tent statements by adding a requirement that the prior statement must have been
available for cross-examination.").
54. Id.
55. Id. The Senate Report stated that the later in-court testimony would allow
the jury to determine the veracity of both the in-court statement and the prior out-of-
court statement by observing only the witness' demeanor during the giving of the
in-court statement.
56. Id.
[Vol. 18
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VIII 1 Federal Rule 801 incorporates the safeguards upon prior out-
of-court statements requested by the House.' Rule 801(d)(1)(A)requires
that all prior inconsistent statements must be given under oath and
subject to cross examination before they are admissible. 9 Rule
801(d)(1)(B) allows prior consistent statements to be introduced at trial
only if they are offered as rebuttal to a charge that the witness' in-
court statement was recently fabricated or the product of improper
influence or motive."0 In 1975, federal courts implemented the new
rules of evidence and prohibited the introduction of any out-of-court
statements not meeting the new criteria."'
While federal courts revamped their evidentiary rules by replac-
ing the traditional standard with a more liberal one, Indiana changed
its position on the admission of out-of-court statements by establishing
one of the most liberal hearsay rules ever adopted by a state.2 While
the Federal Rules are more liberal in introducing prior out-of-court
statements than the traditional standard, they are substantially more
57. 28 U.S.C. SS 801-806 App. (1976). This statute was approved by Congress
on January 2, 1975 and placed into effect July 1, 1975.
58. See supra note 51.
59. FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(1)(A) states: "A statement is not hearsay if-(1) Prior
statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject
to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent
with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at
a trial, hearing or other proceeding, or in a deposition .. "
60. FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(1)(B) states: "A statement is not hearsay if-(1) Prior
statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject
to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (B) consistent with
his testimony and if offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive ... "
61. United States v. Weil, 561 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1977) (court prohibited the
admission of prior consistent statements into evidence unless testimony to be bolstered
was first impeached); United States v. Navarro-Varelas, 541 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1976)
(court excluded tape recording of interview with federal agent which was offered to
prove the prior statement was consistent, since opposing party had not attacked the
in-court testimony as a recent fabrication).
62. Prior to 1975, Indiana did not allow prior statements to be used to prove
the truth-of-the-facts asserted. See, e.g., Harvey v. State, 256 Ind. 473, 269 N.E.2d 473
(1971); Ketcham v. State, 240 Ind. 107, 111, 162 N.E.2d 247, 249 (1959); Diblee v. State,
205 Ind. 571, 177 N.E. 261 (1931); Parker v. State, 196 Ind. 534, 149 N.E. 59 (1925).
Beginning with Skaggs v. State, 260 Ind. 180, 293 N.E.2d 781 (1973), the Supreme Court
of Indiana, when considering whether to exclude hearsay statements, began to
distinguish between instances where the declarant is available for cross-examination
from instances where the declarant is not available for cross-examination. The evidence
that was admitted in Skaggs, however, was found to be non-hearsay and, therefore,
the admission of hearsay available for cross-examination was not addressed.
1984]
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restrictive on out-of-court assertions than are the Uniform Rules." In
contrast, Indiana's hearsay rule is more liberal than the Uniform Rule
in this context because the Indiana rule does not require that the
out-of-court statement meet the admissibility standards of in-court
testimony.' The Supreme Court of Indiana overruled its longstanding
adherence to the traditional standard of restricting out-of-court
statements from substantive evidence in Patterson v. State.5
The question raised before the appellate court in Patterson was
the admissibility of two signed pretrial statements given to the police
by eyewitnesses. 7 The court found that the defense counsel had con-
fronted one of the prosecution's witnesses with excerpts from her prior
statement in an attempt to impeach her credibility. 8 The court found
that the prosecution's purpose in introducing the prior out-of-court
statement was not to prove the truth-of-the-facts asserted in the state-
ment but only to place the partial statement in its proper context. 9
The appellate court held that where a portion of a statement is in-
troduced into evidence, the adverse party is entitled to prove the
remainder."
The appellate court found an additional reason to allow the prior
63. FED. R. EVID. 402 prohibits the admission of any evidence that is not rele-
vant. FED. R. EvID. 602 prohibits the admission of testimony where the declarant does
not have first hand knowledge. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) requires that prior inconsistent
statements must be made under oath with the declarant available for cross-examination
and prior consistent statements may only be offered to rebut charges of fabrication
or influence providing the declarant is available for cross-examination.
In contrast to the number of prerequisites established by the Federal Rules
for out-of-court statements, UNIF. R. EVID. 63(1) only requires that a prior statement be
admissible if made by the declarant while testifying as a witness and that the declarant
be present at the hearing and available for cross-examination with respect to the
statement.
64. Indiana's hearsay rule after Patterson is even more liberal than the Uniform
Rules of Evidence because its only requirement for the admissibility of out-of-court
statements is that the declarant must be available for cross-examination. There is no
requirement that the statement must be relevant, as is found in the Uniform Rules
and the Federal Rules. Nor is there a requirement that the declarant must have first
hand knowledge of the event, which is required in the Federal Rules.
65. 263 Ind. 55, 324 N.E.2d 482 (1975).
66. Patterson v. State, __ Ind. App. -, 314 N.E.2d 92 (1974).
67. Id. at 97.
68. Id. at 97.
69. Id. at 98.
70. Id. at 97. The appellate court cited Shelby Nat'l Bank Adm'r v. Miller,
147 Ind. App. 203, 220, 259 N.E.2d 450, 469 (1970) ("Where a portion of a statement
or conversation is placed into evidence, the adverse party is entitled to prove the
remainder.").
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statement into evidence. The witness's prior out-of-court statement
to the state officer was inconsistent with her in-court statement. The
state was unprepared for the in-court testimony of its witness. The
appellate court held that the state was correct in introducing the prior
statement for the purpose of impeaching its witness' credibility.7'
Therefore, the appellate court utilized the traditional hearsay rule and
held that the prior statements were properly introduced into evidence
for purposes other than to prove the truth of the asserted facts."2
The Supreme Court of Indiana reviewed Patterson using an ap-
proach that conflicted with the findings of the court of appeals." The
Supreme Court found the prior out-of-court statement of the witness
was consistent with the subsequent in-court statement. However, the
Supreme Court viewed the witness' prior statement as somewhat more
incriminating because it disclosed more facts.75 The question establish-
ed and addressed by the Indiana Supreme Court was whether it was
reversible error for the trial court to fail to issue jury instructions
limiting the use of the out-of-court statement to impeachment pur-
poses only.7"
The Supreme Court declared that Patterson would denote "a clear
pronouncement of our departure from an ancient application of the
hearsay rule . . ." The court premised this departure from the tradi-
tional hearsay rule upon authority derived from Harvey v. State" and
Skaggs v. State."9 The Patterson court cited dicta from Harvey for the
proposition that the primary rationale underlying the exclusion of hear-
say is that it is insusceptible to the test of cross-examination.' The
71. Patterson v. State, __ Ind. App. , 314 N.E.2d 92, 98 (1974).
72. Id.
73. Patterson v. State, 263 Ind. 55, 324 N.E.2d 482 (1975).
74. Id. at 58, 324 N.E.2d at 484.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The full quotation reads: "We go first to the 'hearsay evidence' issue
as it is that issue that occasioned the grant of transfer, in hopes of making a clear
pronouncement of our departure from an ancient application of the hearsay rule-one
that we have more recently determined to be a misapplication."
78. 256 Ind. 473, 269 N.E.2d 759 (1971).
79. 260 Ind. 180, 293 N.E.2d 781 (1973).
80. Patterson, 263 Ind. at 57, 324 N.E.2d at 484. The Patterson court used
dicta from Harvey to support its holding that the primary reason for excluding hear-
say is its insusceptibility to cross-examination. The dicta referred to states: "Dunn's
testimony suffers from all the defects of hearsay testimony. Adam's, the out-of-court
declarant, was not under oath, not subject to confrontation by the trier-of-fact, and
most importantly, not subject to cross-examination by the accused when he made his
statements to Dunn." Harvey, 256 Ind. at 477, 269 N.E.2d at 761. Somehow, the Pat-
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court then applied Skaggs for the proposition that prior out-of-court
statements have previously been excluded from evidence in Indiana
because the out-of-court declarant was unavailable for
cross-examination." The Patterson court used the Skaggs distinction
between declarants who are available for cross-examination and those
who are unavailable as authority to admit prior out-of-court statements
where the declarant is available for cross-examination.5
The Indiana Supreme Court erroneously applied the reasoning
developed in Skaggs, which was limited to the distinct factual situa-
tion confronted by the Skaggs court. The prior out-of-court statement
introduced into evidence in Skaggs was a recitation of one of the terms
of employment for a police department informant." The Skaggs' state-
ment was not used to prove the truth-of-a-fact asserted, as distinguish-
ed from such use of the prior statement in Patterson, but only to
establish a factual term of employment. The statement admitted into
evidence in Skaggs does not fall within the definition of hearsay
adopted by the Supreme Court of Indiana.
Hearsay evidence is testimony in court, or written evidence,
of a statement made out-of-court, such statement being of-
fered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted
therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility
of the out-of-court asserter."
Therefore, Patterson utilized the court's language which allowed the
admission of an out-of-court statement when a declarant is available
for cross-examination and which prohibited the admission of such a
statement when a declarant is unavailable for cross-examination. The
terson court interpreted that quote to justify dropping all safeguards and limitations
on the admission of hearsay statements except for the defendant's availability for
cross-examination.
81. Patterson, 263 Ind. at 57, 324 N.E.2d at 484.
82. Id. "In Skaggs, we distinguished prior cases wherein the out-of-court asser-
tions had been excluded, the distinction being in such cases, the out-of-court asserter
was not available for cross-examination. We made no attempt, however, to deal with
prior cases .. " Id.
83. Skaggs, 260 Ind. at 185, 293 N.E.2d 784. "[Iln the case at bar we do not
have a self-serving declaration. The evidence that a police official purported to give
[the informant] permission to use marijuana to facilitate his undercover work is a state-
ment of fact submitted by the state . . . It is merely a recitation of one of the facts
under which [the informant] was working for the police department." Id.
84. This definition of hearsay, taken from C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 584,
has been quoted in many Indiana cases including Patterson, 263 Ind. at 57, 324 N.E.2d
at 484, and Harvey, 256 Ind. at 476, 269 N.E.2d at 760.
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Patterson court then used this distinction, which arose in a non-hearsay
context, as the basis for abandoning the traditional hearsay rule.
By developing the dicta in Harvey and creatively interpreting
the holding in Skaggs, the Indiana Supreme Court established in Pat-
terson a new hearsay rule for Indiana. After Patterson, out-of-court
assertions were to be admitted into evidence for substantive purposes
so long as one condition was met: the out-of-court declarant was
available for cross-examination at the time the statements were in-
troduced in court as substantive evidence. 5 The Patterson court held
that the declarant's availability for cross-examination was sufficient
to remedy any hearsay dangers and therefore prior out-of-court
statements of an available declarant could not be excluded from
evidence."
III. THE PATTERSON RULE STATES THAT CROSS-EXAMINATION
ALONE WILL REMEDY THE UNRELIABILITY OF OUT-OF-COURT
STATEMENTS
The Patterson court's premise that cross-examination eliminates
the hearsay dangers in out-of-court statements, must be examined in
greater depth to determine its validity. It is important to note that
there is a major difference in the value of cross-examination upon prior
inconsistent out-of-court assertions and its value upon prior consis-
tent out-of-court assertions. 7 Cross-examination of the witness in rela-
tion to a prior inconsistent statement affords the cross-examiner the
opportunity to question the prior statement's underlying basis and
purpose and to scrutinize the justification for the current contrary
in-court statement.8 Inquiries into the underlying reasons for conflic-
ting statements disclose the sources of the change and are apt to
reveal which statement, if any, is true. 9 However, the propriety of
85. Patterson, 263 Ind. at 57, 324 N.E.2d at 484.
86. 263 Ind. at 58, 324 N.E.2d at 485. The Patterson theory that availability
for cross-examination eradicates hearsay dangers is in accord with Wigmore, McCor-
mick, the Uniform Rules of Evidence and the Model Code of Evidence. The Patterson
court justified abandoning all other hearsay safeguards based upon these authors and
model rules.
87. McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive
Evidence, 25 TEx. L. REV. 573 (1947).
88. Id. at 577. ("[Tihe witness who has told one story aforetime and another
today has opened the gates to all the vistas of truth which the common law practice
of cross-examination and re-examination were invented to explore.").
89. Id. ("It will go hard, but the two questioners will lay bare the sources
of the change of face, in forgetfulness, carelessness, pity, terror or greed, and reveal
which is the true story and which is false.").
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admitting consistent out-of-court statements as substantive evidence
is of primary concern.90
When prior consistent out-of-court statements are offered into
evidence for substantive purposes, they are rejected in most
jurisdictions.9" The reasons for excluding out-of-court statements are
agreed upon by both Patterson advocates92 and traditional hearsay ad-
vocates alike." "The rule against hearsay seeks to ensure the reliability
of evidence by excluding testimony when the declarant's credibility
cannot be tested."' The differences between traditional hearsay states
and liberal hearsay jurisdictions such as Indiana are found in the con-
flicting methods these jurisdictions employ to eradicate the danger
of unreliable out-of-court assertions.
The Patterson court's statement that cross-examination eliminates
all the dangers of hearsay is not universally accepted.99 Other protec-
tive requirements are traditionally placed upon testimony to encourage
witnesses to tell the truth." These safeguards also give the jury an
90. More detailed discussion of prior inconsistent statements is beyond the
scope of this note. For further discussion regarding this topic, see Bein, Prior Incon-
sistent Statements: The Hearsay Rule, 801 (d)(1)(A) and 803 (24), 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
967 (1979) (limitations that should be placed upon admission of prior inconsistent
statements); Baker, The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules, and Due Process-A
Proposal for Determining When Hearsay May be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L.
REV. 529 (1974) (proposes brief due process hearings when hearsay evidence is offered
as evidence); Beaver and Biggs, Attending Witnesses' Prior Declarations as Evidence:
Theory vs. Reality, 3 IND. LEGAL F. 309 (1970) (problems created by admitting hearsay
evidence); McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive
Evidence, 25 TEx. L. REV. 573 (1947) (positive aspects of the admission of prior inconsis-
tent statements).
91. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
92. Arnold v. State, - Ind. App. -, 383 N.E.2d 461, 463 (1978) ("[Hear-
say] ... has as its basis, a fear that the out-of-court statement may be unreliable.").
93. C. MCCORMICK. supra note 1, at S 245. Hearsay usually invokes the fear of
the credibility of the testimony. Safeguards help ensure the reliability of the evidence.
Id.
94. Comment, Evidence-Hearsay and Confrontation, 27 S.C. L. REv. 257, 259
(1975).
95. Younger, Reflections on the Rule Against Hearsay, 32 S.C. L. REV. 281, 282
(1980). What the hearsay law gives the adversary is protection, not against uncross-
examined evidence, but against unreliable evidence. The sole assurance of reliability
is not cross-examination. Cross-examination is only one tool to ensure reliability.
96. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at S 245. See also Beaver and Biggs, supra
note 90, at 316. An out-of-court statement may be admitted as substantive evidence
if it is classified as a spontaneous statement, a contemporaneous statement, or a declara-
tion against interest. Some subjective psychological quality of the declarant or objec-
tive condition of the surrounding circumstances supply the test of trustworthiness. Id.
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excellent opportunity to determine the declarant's veracity. The re-
quirements of an oath and a jury's observation of the declarant's in-
court testimony are two examples of well established safeguards placed
upon substantive evidence." Traditionalists hold that these safeguards
on in-court testimony, combined with cross-examination, are necessary
to ensure that the jury receives reliable evidence. 8 The initial prob-
lem is whether all three safeguards listed above are necessary to en-
sure reliable testimony. Another problem is determining what foun-
dational requirements are necessary for effective cross-examination.
Those jurisdictions which allow out-of-court statements into
evidence to prove the truth-of-the-facts asserted do not require that
all such safeguards be utilized.' Some proponents of the admission
of hearsay stress that a prior statement should be made under oath.1 0
The safeguard of oath has been viewed as an important tool to instill
in the witness a feeling of special obligation to tell the truth."1 It
also impresses upon the witness the sanction of criminal punishment
for perjury if the truth is not disclosed."° Most state and federal courts
affirm the importance of an oath by requiring that all in-court
testimony be given under oath.1 0 3
Some authorities discard the importance of a prior out-of-court
statement being made under oath, as do some states which allow hear-
say to be admitted into substantive evidence."w These courts hold that
97. See C. MCCORMICK supra note 1, at 581.
98. Id.
99. See FED. R. EvID. 801 (d)(1)(A) (requiring declarant to be available for cross-
examination in addition to requirement of oath); FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(1)(B) (requiring
declarant to be available for cross-examination and restricting statement to be in-
troduced only as rebuttal to charge of fabrication or improper influence or motive).
See also Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 230, 163 N.W.2d 609 (1969) (requiring declarant
to be available for cross-examination and requiring that declarant have first hand
knowledge of event in question).
100. See McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive
Evidence, 25 Thx. L. REV. 573 (1947); FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(1)(A); State v. Parish, 79 N.C.
610, - (1878) ("[Ilt was unnecessary and mischievious to encounter the court and
oppress the defendant with his garrulousness out-of-court statement and when not
under oath.").
101. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 582. Accord N.J. R. EVID. 63 (1XaXii) (1967).
102. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 582.
103. FED. R. EvID. 603 states, "Before testifying, every witness shall be required
to declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form
calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his mind with his duty to do so."
104. 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 28, at 10. ("It is clear beyond a doubt
that the oath, as thus referred to, is merely an incidental feature customarily accom-
panying cross-examination . . ."). See also Gelhaar, 41 Wis. at 234, 163 N.W.2d at 612.
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the purpose and effectiveness of oaths was historic and not applicable
to ensure reliability in today's courts. 5 Opponents of the oath require-
ment contend that even if the oath were to adequately ensure the
reliability of out-of-court statements, such a requirement is un-
necessary. When a witness is on the stand and testifying about an
out-of-court assertion that witness is under oath. Therefore, the
reliability of the in-court statement ensures the reliability of the con-
sistent out-of-court statement."' Though the liberals' view of an oath's
importance has been shown to be inappropriate in some instances, '7
this theory is nonetheless one justification for requiring only cross-
examination as a safeguard for hearsay reliability.
If one accepts the liberal hearsay rule proponents' view that an
oath is not an essential safeguard to ensure that out-of-court
statements are reliable, the next logical inquiry is whether observa-
tion of the witness' demeanor is necessary. More particularly, the ques-
tion becomes one of whether the jury's observation of the witness,
while that witness makes an in-court statement, is sufficient or
necessary to ensure the reliability of the out-of court statement.'"
Those who stress the value of witness demeanor hold that the solem-
nity of the court setting and the possibility of public disgrace will
impress upon the witness the necessity for telling the truth."' Per-
sonal presence also ensures that the reporting of an oral statement
is done accurately."' The declarant's presence before the jury, con-
temporaneous with his statement, allows the jury to observe the
declarant's demeanor so that they may more accurately determine the
Accord KAN. STAT. ANN. S 60-460 (1976); CAL. EvID. CODE S 1236 (West 1966); N.J. R. EVID.
63 (1967).
105. 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 28, at S 1364. Originally, the sworn state-
ment was seen as imperative to ensure the reliability of out-of-court assertions. By
1696 the importance of cross-examination was realized; subsequently, neither prior sworn
nor unsworn statements could be admitted into evidence without the right of
cross-examination.
106. See supra note 53. The senate committee could not justify the necessity
of oath in admitting out-of-court statements when the only hearsay exception that re-
quired oath was former testimony.
107. See Torrence v. State, 263 Ind. 202, 328 N.E2d 214 (1975), in which a witness
testified against the defendant in court and subsequently issued a written statement
refuting his in-court testimony. At a post-conviction hearing the statement was admit-
ted via the Patterson rule, although the witness testified that he was not afraid of
perjuring himself in an affidavit because the notary never made him swear to the
affidavit's truth.
108. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 28, at 582.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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sincerity and veracity of the statement.111 Without the declarant's
presence contemporaneous with his statement the jury is unfairly re-
quired to rely upon the witness' perception and memory of his
sincerity at the time the out-of-court statement was made.
1 2
It is always preferable to have the declarant testify before the
jury to permit the jury to observe the declarant's demeanor."'
However, that ideal situation is not always possible. 14 Necessity may
require the introduction of out-of-court statements over the alternative
loss of relevant and necessary evidence."' It has been argued that
the inability to observe the declarant's out-of-court demeanor is
analogous to the absence of an oath by an out-of court declarant."' 6
If the jury can observe the declarant during his in-court testimony,
they will be able to determine the declarant's veracity and reliability
at the time the out-of-court statement was made. 7 It also has been
pointed out that under certain conditions, such as a videotaped state-
ment, the jury is effectively allowed to observe the actual demeanor
of the witness at the time the former statement was made."
ill. See Flewallen v. State, 267 Ind. 90, 93, 368 N.E.2d 239, 243 (1977) (dissent
by Justice DeBruler). See also Comment, Evidence-Hearsay and Confrontation, 27 S.C.
L. REv. 257, 271 (1975). The reliability of out-of-court statements cannot be assured if
there is no jury present at the time the statement is made and the trial jury is also
unable to observe the witness' demeanor during trial because the witness pleads the
fifth amendment.
112. See Bein, supra note 90 at 1023. Bein discusses the pitfall of a witness
who fails to remember the act underlying his out-of-court statement. There is a serious
question whether that witness can remember his sincerity at the time the out-of-court
statement was made.
113. Samuels v. State, 267 Ind. 676, 372 N.E.2d 1186 (1978), in which the court
held that the Patterson rule cannot allow out-of-court statements to be introduced into
evidence as a substitute for available in-court testimony. Note that the opinion was
written by Justice Prentice, who also authored the Patterson opinion.
114. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1969) (witness stated at trial that
he could not remember facts of the event in question or the truth of his prior statement).
115. See Flewallen, 267 Ind. at 93, 368 N.E.2d at 243 (DeBruler, J., dissenting).
116. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
117. Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F2d 364 (2nd Cir. 1925) (opinion by Judge
Learned Hand). "If from all that the jury sees of the witness, they conclude that what
he says now is not the truth, but what he said before, they are none the less deciding
from what they see and hear of that person in court." Id at 368. Though this argu-
ment was used in the context of a prior inconsistent statement and bases reliability
upon the fact there is a contradiction in statements, it has been applied to cases of
consistent prior statements also.
118. Cook v. State, 269 Ind. 227, 229, 379 N.E.2d 965, 966 (1978) (Prentice, J.).
The court held that the weight and credibility of evidence presented on the issue
of voluntariness of the out-of-court statement were matters for the jury to determine.
Jurors had heard the witness testify at trial that he was coerced into confessing. The
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Therefore, though courts do prefer the declarant's presence at the
time the original statement is made, " 9 such presence like an oath, is
not viewed by liberal hearsay proponents as an indispensible safeguard
to ensure the statement's reliability.
If the oath and demeanor of the witness are not necessary to
secure the veracity of a statement, it follows that the only remaining
acknowledged guarantor of reliability is cross-examination of the
declarant. The usual requirements to ensure declarant availability for
cross-examination are that: (1) the declarant must be physically pre-
sent at the trial:20 (2) the declarant must not invoke his fifth amend-
ment privilege or otherwise be unavailable for questioning, 2 ' and (3)
the declarant must testify on direct examination at the hearing or
trial.'22 Normally these criteria allow a cross-examining attorney to
question the witness in an adversary context, providing counsel with
the opportunity to challenge the witness's story or induce the witness
to equivocate the prior statement and thus disclose the truth.'23 Dean
Wigmore went so far as to state that cross-examination is "beyond
jury had also observed a videotape of the defendant's confession, in which he was
advised of his rights and in which the defendant stated he was present at the scene
and had first hand knowledge. The Cook court implied that the witness' demeanor
was important and that the videotape was imperative to the admission of the declarant's
out-of-court statement.
119. See Samuels, 267 Ind. at 671, 679 372 N.E.2d at 1188.
120. Thompson v. Norman, 198 Kan. 436, 424 P.2d 593 (1967) (court held that
although third party's deposition was available at trial, where third party was never
confronted with the statement in issue during the deposition nor questioned about
it, deposition did not satisfy requirement that declarant must be available for
cross-examination).
121. Taggert v. State, 269 Ind. 667, 382 N.E.2d 916 (1978). In Taggert, a third
party confessor asserted his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The
court held that the Patterson rule criterion of availability was not met. Consequently
the hearsay evidence was not admitted. See also Pitts v. State, - Fla. App. -,
307 So. 2d 473, 486 (1975). "If admission of guilt by a party unavailable for cross-
examination either as a result of absence or refusal to testify were held admissible
in evidence at trial, a veritable 'daisy chain' of extrajudicial confessions would be the
inevitable result. An acquitted defendant could submit confessions at a co-defendant's
subsequent trial and acquit that party while being protected by double jeopardy."
Id. at 486.
122. State v. Fisher, 222 Kan. 76, 563 P.2d 1012 (1977). Fisher corrects the
availability problem by holding that before the opponent can effectively cross-examine
a witness, the proponent must call the witness to the stand for direct-examination.
If the witness is not called by the opposition, there is a severe limitation on the adver-
sary context of the examination and effective cross-examination is not possible.
123. Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102, 150 N.W.2d 146 (1967) (court set forth goals
of effective cross-examination and explained why prior out-of-court statements could
not be properly cross-examined).
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doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth." '124 Every jurisdiction requires that the declarant must be
available for cross-examination before testimony may be introduced
into evidence. 2 ' If cross-examination is indeed the most effective
safeguard to secure an in-court statement's reliability, it is necessary
-to ascertain its effectiveness upon prior out-of-court statements.
There exists a minority view which posits that cross-examination
of a prior out-of-court statement is as equally compelling to invoke
a reliable statement as when the original statement is made in-court."
Proponents of this view maintain that when the declarant is on the
stand and testifying at trial, he is available for questions upon both
in-court and out-of-court statements.' The declarant's answers to
cross-examination questions are under oath whether the question per-
tains to an in-court statement or an out-of-court statement. Therefore,
a safeguard exists to ensure the reliability of an out-of-court
statement.'28 The ability to cross-examine the out-of-court declarant
at trial is viewed as providing all the necessary safeguards for ob-
taining the truth, thus allowing a reasonable departure from the tradi-
tional hearsay rule.'"
However, cross-examination of a prior out-of-court statement
creates problems not encountered in the cross-examination of an in-
court statement. 0 The declarant may not remember the event that
prompted the prior out-of-court statement and may not recall making
124. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. The Judicial Conference found
that cross-examination was a vital feature of the Anglo-American system of law. Id.
125. See supra note 43. Traditional hearsay states, liberal hearsay states, and
those states and jurisdictions which have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence all
require that the declarant be available for cross-examination.
126. See Bein supra note 92, at 995 ("Cross-examination can be as thorough
as if the prior statement had been made on direct-examination."). See also Kirkpatrick,
Reforming Evidence Law in Oregon, 59 OR L. REV. 43, 104 (1980) ("[There is] no reason
why cross-examination at the time the statement is offered into evidence cannot ade-
quately expose inaccuracies of earlier testimony.").
127. The Senate Evidentiary Committee felt that it was unnecessary to re-
quire that a prior out-of-court statement be subject to cross-examination. See supra
note 53.
128. 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 28, at 996. ("[T]he witness is present
and subject to cross-examination. There is ample opportunity to test him as to the
basis of his former statement.").
129. See Moten v. State, 269 Ind. 309, 380 N.E.2d 544 (1978), in which the court
allowed the prior out-of-court statements of several witnesses, each witness having
a consistent statement.
130. See McCormick, supra note 100, at 576-77.
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the statement at all.' These circumstances prevent the opposition
from performing an effective cross-examination.'32 It is the adversarial
nature of cross-examination that challenges the witness' veracity.
Cross-examination enables the jury to evaluate the truthfulness of the
witness' prior statement by observing that witness' reaction and
response to the cross-examiner's contention that the prior out-of-court-
statement was false. Effective cross-examination requires an adver-
sary setting. Either a witness who alleges a fact must be examined
by a lawyer who wants him to deny that fact, or a witness who denies
a fact must be examined by a lawyer who wants him to affirm it. 33
If the witness does not have adequate memory of the prior event,
it is impossible for the cross-examiner to compel the witness to adopt
a position as to what occurred. It is not possible to effectively
challenge the facts of a witness' statement until the witness expresses
a firm position on those facts.' In the situation where a non-declarant
witness of the out-of-court statement is under oath at trial and sub-
ject to cross-examination, the in-court statement's reliability is not
secured if the underlying event is not clearly remembered by that
witness. 35 The extent to which the cross-examiner would be able to
challenge the witness or induce him to equivocate concerning the
veracity of a prior statement is very limited because that witness
does not know if the out-of-court statement was true. The cross-
examiner is, therefore, unable to challenge this witness about the
truthfulness of the statement and it is introduced into evidence without
any safeguard as to its veracity."
Even when the declarant has a clear memory of the prior event
and remembers making the prior statement in a specific context, cross-
examination is inadequate to ensure veracity. 37 The principle virtue
of cross-examination is its immediate application as a testing process.
"Its strokes fall while the iron is hot."'" False testimony will harden
131. Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 43 (1954).
132. See Ruhala 379 Mich. at 113, 150 N.W.2d at 156.
133. Id.
134. See Falknor, supra note 131, at 47 ("Suppose [the declarant] purports not
to remember the particular matter to which the alleged prior statement relates ..
. it is evident that cross-examination does not hold much promise as a satisfactory
'testing' procedure.").
135. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
136. See Ruhala, 379 Mich. at 113, 150 N.W.2d at 156.
137. See People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 441 P.2d 111 (1968), in which the
court held that belated cross-examination before the jury is not an adequate substitute
for the right to cross-examine contemporaneously with the original testimony.
138. State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 258, 362, 285 N.W.898, 901 (1938). In Saporen,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld the traditional rules of hearsay by preven-
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and become further entrenched in the witness's statements as the
witness feels more necessity to maintain a consistent position."3 9 A
witness may also be influenced between the time his out-of-court state-
ment is made and the time he testifies by others who wish to main-
tain a falsehood and thus impede disclosure of the truth." ° Even if
the thrust of cross-examination is relatively deadly to the in-court con-
sistent statement, the memory of the prior out-of-court statement may
remain unscathed in the back of the juror's mind."" The jury may
not realize that impeachment of the in-court statement creates an im-
peachment of the prior out-of-court statement.
In those situations were the trial witness is not the actual
declarant of the out-of-court statement, but rather someone who heard
the out-of-court statement made by another, the probability of cross-
examination ensuring the statement's reliability becomes negligible.
In this context, the only effect of cross-examination is to probe the
sincerity, perception, memory and narrative capacity of the observer
of the declaration, not those qualities of the declarant himself."' Thus,
the cross-examiner is unable to test the reliability of this witness's
factual basis and is only examining the witness's ability to report what
he heard. This procedure will not serve to ensure the reliability of
the underlying statement.'
Even if proper safeguards for the reliability of prior out-of-court
statements are created and implemented, the value of such statements
nevertheless remains inherently suspect. The situation and context
under which the prior statements are offered at trial determines their
evidentiary value." The most common uses of prior consistent
statements include situations in which they are: (1) offered in the case-
in-chief before any impeachment: (2) offered after impeachment by
subsequent inconsistent statements, and (3) offered after impeachment
consisting of charges of recent fabrication or improper influence.'
The merit of these uses is controversial.
ting prior out-of-court statements to be admitted for substantive purposes. It held
cross-examination of prior our-of-court statements to be virtually ineffective. Id.
139. Id. ("False testimony is apt to harden and become unyielding to the blows
of truth in proportion as the witness has opportunity for reconsideration and influence
by the suggestions of others, whose interest may be, and often is, to maintain falsehood
rather than truth.").
140. Id. But see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 602.
141. See Ruhala, 379 Mich. at 115, 150 N.W.2d at 158.
142. See Beaver and Biggs, supra note 96.
143. Id.
144. 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE. supra note 28, at 255.
145. Id. at 255-60.
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The most unnecessary use of prior consistent statements is their
introduction during direct examination in the case-in-chief. In this con-
text, the proof that a consistent statement was made is neither essen-
tial nor valuable to the determination of the truth."6 The mere repeti-
tion of a story does not increase its truthfulness.'47 Common observa-
tion and experience reveal that a falsehood may be repeated as often
as the truth.48 Repetition does not magically enrich the substantive
value of such statements,"9 for an inaccurate story is just as incor-
rect after ten repetitions as it was originally. 5'
Not only does a prior consistent statement have little or no
positive value before impeachment, it adversely affects a trial. The
prior consistent statement wastes valuable court time by bolstering
the declarant's in-court testimony before any contest to the testimony
is made by the opponent." It is possible that the opponent will not
challenge the in-court statement, thereby making rehabilitation of the
declarant's testimony unnecessary. Furthermore, prior statements
enable a declarant to repeat his testimony on direct examination over
the opponent's objection. 5' The declarant can testify about an event
he observed and, during the same direct examination, testify as to
what he told others out-of-court about that event. It is prejudicial to
an opponent when a court permits the state's witnesses to repeat their
testimony over objection on direct examination and just as prejudicial
to permit the state to use prior consistent statements for that
purpose." If the court prohibits a witness from bolstering his state-
ment by repeating it, that same repetition should not be permitted
146. Id. at 255 ("When the witness has merely testified on direct-examination,
without impeachment, proof of consistent statements is unnecessary and valueless.").
See also Travers, Prior Consistent Statements, 57 NEB. L. REV. 974, 981-982 (1978) (if
jurors are given no reason to disbelieve the in-court statement, they will have little
interest in prior consistent statements regardless of the use to be made of such
statements).
147. See State v. Parish, 79 N.C. 610, 612 (1878) (out-of-court statement not
merely of little value, but also dangerous because it was not made under oath).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 28, at 255.
151. See Flewallen, 267 Ind. at 94, 368 N.E.2d at 243. See also C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 1, at 103.
152. Karlson, Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Law-Evidence, 12 IND.
L. REV. 192 (1979). Karlson discusses Flewallen and the problems involved when the court
allows statements to verify the content of an out-of-court declaration. Karlson found
that the repetitiveness of the statement in Flewallen was designed to bolster the in-
court testimony of the declarant and to reemphasize its content.
153. Id. at 194.
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through an indirect means, such as the admission of a prior consis-
tent statement.5
Just as prior statements allow the witness to improperly repeat
testimony, such statements also permit leading questions on direct
examination."'5 Leading questions suggest to the witness the answer
that is desired and thus remove from the examination the illicitation
of a spontaneous answer that is more likely to be truthful.'" Allow-
ing prior consistent statements to be introduced before the declarant
testifies on direct examination permits a leading question in its most
objectionable form.15 The direct examiner is permitted to prompt the
witness on all the details of the story before any questions are asked
of the declarant. 5' The in-court testimony may become nothing more
than an acknowledgment or reiteration of the prior statement read
to the witness.
The out-of-court statement may act as a substitution for in-court
testimony if the witness simply verifies the accuracy of the prior
statement.55 If the prior statement is used as substantive evidence
and there is no other corroborative evidence introduced at trial, a
conviction may be based upon ex parte statements. 5 The "best
evidence rule"'6 1 should be applied in this situation when both the
prior out-of-court statement and contemporaneous in-court statement
are available. Live in-court testimony is preferred to a hearsay state-
ment. The live statement will be admitted to the exclusion of the hear-
say statement whenever the live statement is available." Not only
will in-court testimony remedy the problem of ex parte convictions
154. Id.
155. Gooderson, Previous Consistent Statements, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 64 (1968).
Gooderson provides English criticism regarding the introduction of prior statements
into evidence. It is important to note that England has abolished the hearsay rule
and therefore has had more experience in resolving the difficulties of using hearsay
evidence.
156. See C. MCCORMICK. supra note 1, at 8.
157. See Gooderson, supra note 155, at 67.
158. Id.
159. See Flewallen, 267 Ind. at 92, 368 N.E.2d at 241. In Fewallen, the court
allowed the prior consistent statement to be read in its entirety to the jury even
though the declarant was present at trial. The declarant testified briefly only to
acknowledge the accuracy of the statement. Id.
160. See Bein, supra note 90.
161. See C. MCCORMICK. supra note 1, at 559 ("The 'best evidence rule' requires
that the best evidence the nature of the case will admit, shall always be required,
if possible to be had; but if not possible, then the best evidence that can be had shall
be allowed."). See also Gard, Survey of Kansas Law-Evidence, 12 KAN. L. REv. 239 (1963).
162. See C. MCCORMICK. supra note 1, at 559.
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but it will also allow the implementation of the traditional safeguards
of witness reliability.
In contrast to statements used as substitutes for in-court
testimony, out-of-court statements offered after the opposing counsel
has impeached the witness with inconsistent statements do not have
the same potential for admitting unnecessary hearsay. The admission
of unnecessary hearsay is limited because the prior statements are
not used in direct examination but are restricted to redirect-
examination or rebuttal evidence. However, statements introduced
after impeachment do have the possible danger of permitting the
declarant to make both consistent and inconsistent statements out-of-
court and then selecting the most appropriate statement to support
the current in-court testimony."l This situation leaves the declarant
with a statement to bolster his testimony regardless of which story
he eventually choses to give at trial." In order to obtain the improved
accuracy inherent in a prior statement made close to an event, the
court should only admit those prior consistent statements made close
to the event rather than subsequent inconsistent statements."5 Any
prior consistent extra-judicial statement made after the prior incon-
sistent statement should not be admitted. The later prior consistent
statement was made further from circumstances surrounding the event
and has less proximity to the event than the inconsistent statement.
If either out-of-court statement should be allowed, it should be that
statement made nearer to the event when the details were fresher
in the declarant's mind. Admitting both statements increases the pro-
bability of statement fabrication.'"
The last kind of prior consistent statements to be discussed are
prior statements offered after the in-court testimony is impeached by
charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive."' 7 The
admission of prior statements in this context is very limited because
the opposing counsel must open the door to the hearsay statement
by stating or implying that the in-court statement was fabricated or
163. See Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 439 (1936).
164. Id.
165. Graham, Prior Consistent Statements: Rule 801 (d)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, Critique and Proposal, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 575 (1979).
166. Id. at 601 ("It is possible, if not probable, that the inducement to make
... [prior consistent statements] is for the very purpose of counteracting those first
statements uttered.").
167. These prior consistent statements are allowed into evidence by the Pat-
terson rule and are specifically admitted into substantive evidence by FED. R. EVID.
801 (d)(1)(B).
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improperly influenced.' 8 The limitation on the situations under which
such statements are admitted restricts the opportunity for abusive
use of such statements. An opposing party who would be harmed by
the statements is, in effect, given control of their introduction.' 9
Although these hearsay statements also have a higher risk of
unreliability than in-court statements, the fact that the party that can
be harmed by the statements has the power to limit their admission
tends to justify their introduction into evidence for rebuttal purposes
only.
In contrast to the aforementioned negative traits of prior con-
sistent statements, there are acknowledged positive attributes of such
statements. The most pervasive and frequently used justification for
admitting prior consistent statements is that the prior statement was
made more proximate to the event in question and therefore is likely
to be more accurate than later testimony.' 0 Another view is that the
prior statement is superior to in-court testimony simply because it
was made nearer the event and is less likely to be the result of a
cognitive process.' The greater the lapse of time between the event
and the trial, the greater the chance the declarant will be exposed
to influences and either second guess what was observed, or lose a
clear memory of the event altogether.' 2 Therefore, based upon the
value of its proximity to the event, the prior consistent statement
is considered both reliable and valuable.
In response to the alleged benefits of the "nearest in time" argu-
ment, virtually every hearsay statement offered in any case will be
made nearer in time to the event than the in-court testimony.'' Unless
the hearsay rule is to be abandoned altogether, the argument that
nearness in time in and of itself assures accuracy cannot be used to
justify the admission of out-of-court statements.' The enhanced
168. See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 50.
169. Id.
170. See Bein, supra note 90, at 970. Bein sets forth the acknowledged benefits
of prior statements, primarily in the context of prior inconsistent statements. She also
points out the negative aspects of out-of-court statements that create a need for restraint
and safeguards on their admission. See also McCormick, supra note 87, at 577.
171. See McCormick, supra note 87, at 577 ("The courts themselves stress the
importance of recency of memory ... The time element plays an important part, always
favoring the earlier, in respect of all the hazards [of hearsay].").
172. Id. Accord C. MCCORMICK. supra note 1, at 602 ("The requirement of the
hearsay exception of memoranda of past recollection, that the matter have been recorded
while fresh in the memory, is based precisely on this principle.").
173. See Bein, supra note 90, at 970.
174. Id. at 971.
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reliability of a prior statement decreases as the length of time be-
tween the event and the making of the statement increases. Therefore,
the theory that statements made nearer the event are per se more
accurate than statements made sometime after the event, for exam-
ple at trial, is suspect at best. If this "freshness" theory is to be viable,
standards should be established concerning the maximum time period
which may elapse between the event's occurrence and the making of
a statement regarding the event; if the time period is lapsed, the
assumed accuracy of the prior statement would be forfeited. A stan-
dard of this sort would ensure that prior statements which are ad-
mitted were actually made while the declarant possessed a clear
memory.
Another proposed benefit from prior consistent statements is that
they logically support a witness' credibility." 5 This is an important
rebuttal tool when the witness has been impeached by allegations of
undue influence or motive.17 If the prior statement is used only to
disprove these charges of influence or motive, and not used as new
substantive evidence, their admission will help the jury to better deter-
mine a witness' credibility without unduly prejudicing the opposing
party. 77
A balancing test should be used to determine whether prior con-
sistent statements should be admitted into evidence. This test would
weigh the difference between the value of the prior statements and
the dangers inherent in admitting such statements.'18 Positive at-
tributes of prior statements include greater accuracy due to nearer
proximity in time to the event in question and logical support for
a witness' credibility. 179 These benefits must be balanced against the
dangers of wasting court time, repetition of testimony, allowing leading
questions on direct examination and substituting out-of-court
statements for available in-court testimony." These factors should be
balanced by the court on a case-by-case basis to determine if the ad-
mission of the prior out-of-court statements will allow the jury to
receive the most necessary and reliable evidence.'
175. See Graham, supra note 165.
176. See FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(1)(B).
177. Gard, Survey of Kansas Law-Evidence, 12 KAN. L. REV. 239 (1963).
178. See Graham, supra note 165, at 616 ("[The] risk of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, and misleading the jury associated with the introduction of consis-
tent statements should not be entertained when the prior consistent statement neither
denies, explains, nor rebuts . .. ").
179. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 151, 152, 157 and accompanying text.
181. Baker, The Right to Confrontation, The Hearsay Rules, and Due Process-a
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The Patterson hearsay rule did not provide for any balancing
of prior consistent statements' positive and negative attributes. The
original Patterson rule allowed the introduction of any prior state-
ment, consistent or inconsistent, requiring only that the declarant be
available in court for cross-examination. The rule was established
without specifying any benefit to be gained from the introduction of
prior statements. The Patterson court simply ruled that cross-
examination would properly safeguard any hearsay defects and failed
to explain its analysis for reaching such a conclusion.182 This simplistic
policy has opened the door to unreliable evidence.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PATTERSON RULE AND ITS NEGATIVE
TRAITS
The Patterson rule is such a liberal hearsay rule that both the
Indiana Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Indiana have
placed limitations upon its application." Notwithstanding these addi-
tional limitations, this rule permits the introduction of unreliable
statements into substantive evidence."8 The Patterson rule also creates
the potential for allowing unreliable evidence into the courtroom in
situations that have not as yet been brought before Indiana's courts.'85
In response to the dangers inherent in the Patterson rule, other states
that have abandoned the traditional hearsay rule have implemented
vital additional restrictions on the admissibility of out-of-court
statements. These restrictions can be applied to the Patterson rule
to increase the reliability of hearsay introduced in Indiana courts
without unnecessarily impeaching the introduction of out-of-court
statements.
A. The Patterson rule has been limited by subsequent Indiana case
law.
Soon after the Patterson holding was handed down, Indiana courts
began to limit its application in order to increase the reliability of
out-of-court statements. This limitation was achieved by narrowing
Proposal for Determining when Hearsay may be used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L.
REV. 529 (1974).
182. See Patterson v. State, 263 Ind. 55, 57, 324 N.E.2d 482, 484 (1975).
183. See infra notes 188-213 and accompanying text.
184. See infra notes 223-49 and accompanying text.
185. See infra notes 255-60 and accompanying text.
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the scope of admissible extrajudicial statements. The Indiana Court
of Appeals has been very active in restricting the Patterson rule. The
first restriction on the rule came in Lloyd v. State."6 In Lloyd, the
trial court admitted the prior statement of a witness who claimed
at trial that he had no memory of the portion of the statement in
question. The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that
the Patterson rule cannot be used to admit out-of-court statements
when the declarant does not remember that part of the statement
which is prejudicial to the defendant. 8 Therefore, the Lloyd court
prohibited the hearsay statement from being considered in determin-
ing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the defendant's
conviction.
The Lloyd court's requirement that a witness recall making the
prior out-of-court statement before the Patterson rule may be used
to admit the statement was supported in the Indiana Supreme Court
in Lamar v. State188 and the appellate case of Carter v. State.89 Both
of these subsequent cases built upon Lloyd in establishing prerequisites
to the admission of out-of-court statements. In Lamar, the supreme
court allowed the extrajudicial statements of the defendant's son to
be admitted into substantive evidence, requiring that: (1) the witness
not deny making the statement; (2) the witness not profess ignorance
of the statement, and (3) the witness be available for
cross-examination."9 The Lamar court found these prerequisites to
be implicit in Patterson's fact situation. Consequently, the court re-
quired a showing of such prerequisites before the Patterson rule would
be applied."'
186. 166 Ind. App. 248, 335 N.E.2d 232 (1975). In Lloyd, the trial court allowed
a witness' prior out-of-court statement to be introduced into evidence via the Patter-
son rule even though the witness claimed he was unable to remember making the
portions of the statement describing the defendant's involvement.
187. Id. at 256, 335 N.E.2d at 237. The Lloyd court would not allow an out-of-
court statement into evidence because the declarant had forgotten he made the state-
ment. In order for such a prior statement to be allowed, there must be a written
statement of such a declaration introduction into evidence, or other extrinsic evidence
that the statement was made. Id.
188. 266 Ind. 689, 366 N.E.2d 652 (1977).
189. Carter v. State, - Ind. App. -, 412 N.E.2d 825 (1980). The Carter
court interpreted a quotation from Patterson as establishing foundational requirements
for the Patterson rule. These requirements include: 1. the physical presence of the
declarant in the courtroom; 2. the declarant must be confronted with the prior state-
ment and either acknowledge or disavow making the statement; and 3. the declarant's
testimony concerning the statement must be subject to cross-examination. Id. at 829.
190. See Lamar, 266 Ind. at 694, 366 N.E.2d at 665.
191. Id.
[Vol. 18
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 [1984], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss2/8
PATTERSON RULE
In Carter, the court of appeals interpreted the same Patterson
language which was cited by Lamar as a basis for its prerequisite
requirements regarding application of the Patterson rule. The Carter
decision confirmed Lamar's requirement that the witness be available
for cross-examination, but established two additional requirements
which are perceived as slightly different from the requirements forth
in Lamar. Carter construed the words "available for cross-examination"
in Patterson to means that: (1) the witness must be physically pre-
sent in the courtroom and, (2) the witness must acknowledge or
disavow making the prior statement.'92 The Carter court went on to
hold that if a witness denied or failed to recollect making a prior state-
ment, that witness would not be available for effective
cross-examination.'93 Therefore, Lloyd, Lamar and Carter all hold that
memory of the prior statement is a prerequisite to implementing the
Patterson rule."
The Indiana Supreme Court has recently cast doubt about the
validity of the memory requirement established in Indiana's appellate
courts. In Limp v. State,'95 the supreme court held that a witness'
credibility can be attacked by a prior inconsistent statement. The court
defined an inconsistent statement to include a statement the witness
denied making or a statement that the witness couldn't remember
making.'" The Limp court held that prior inconsistent statement can
be introduced into evidence to prove the truth-of-the-facts asserted.
Given the holding in Limp, the prosecutor can ask the witness on
direct examination whether he had made a prior statement. If the
answer is "no" or "I don't remember," the prosecutor can then claim
the in-court statement is inconsistent with the out-of-court statement
and introduce the prior out-of-court statement as substantive evidence.
Although the Indiana Supreme Court did not directly overrule Lamar
or address the memory requirements established by the appellate
court in Lloyd or Carter, the Limp decision opens the door to the
admission of out-of-court statements for substantive purposes even
when the declarant does not remember making the statement.
In contrast to the tenuous appellate court restrictions on Patter-
192. See Carter, - Ind. App. at -, 412 N.E.2d at 830.
193. Id.
194. But see Arch v. State, 269 Ind. 450, 381 N.E.2d 465 (1978), in which the
Indiana Supreme Court allowed a declarant's out-of-court statement after the declarant
failed to recall the events in question. The court deemed it necessary to admit the
prior statements as the declarant was considered a hostile witness.
195. __ Ind. - 431 N.E.2d 784 (1982).
196. Id. at , 431 N.E.2d at 787.
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son that have not yet been incorporated by the Indiana Supreme
Court, the latter court has imposed a limitation upon the Patterson
rule prohibiting a party from proving its case through the use of sworn
statements when the witness is available for in-court testimony.9 ' In
Samuels v. State,'98 the supreme court prohibited out-of-court
statements from being used as a substitute for in-court testimony.
Samuels was decided as a response to the case of Flewallen v. State.'99
In Flewallen, the supreme court allowed the prosecution to read prior
statements to the jury in lieu of direct personal testimony from a
witness who was sitting in the courtroom."' The Flewallen court cited
the Patterson rule as its authority for admitting the prior statements
into evidence."0 Samuels overruled Flewallen and held that absent the
necessity of choosing between permitting prior statements to be used
as substantive evidence or the total loss of necessary relevant
evidence, the court must attempt to base its case upon live in-court
testimony to alleviate the dangers of hearsay."0 2
The Indiana Court of Appeals expanded the Patterson limitation
established in Samuels, holding in D.H. v. J.H."' that before an out-
of-court statement may be introduced into evidence, the declarant must
testify in court."' Requiring the out-of-court declarant to testify in-
197. Samuels v. State, 267 Ind. 676, 372 N.E.2d 1186 (1978) (opinion by Justice
Prentice, author of the Patterson rule) (use of out-of-court statements as substitutes
for in-court statements created need to re-evaluate the Patterson rule).
198. Id.
199. 267 Ind. 90, 368 N.E.2d 239 (1977).
200. Id. The trial court allowed the State to read to the jury statements
prepared by witnesses prior to trial. Each witness simply confirmed that he or she
made the prior statement. There was no effective direct-examination of the witness
on the stand. The Supreme Court of Indiana upheld the introduction of the prior
statements citing the Patterson rule. 267 Ind. at 94, 368 N.E.2d at 241. The court held
that the Patterson rule only required that the declarant be available for cross-
examination. Justice DeBruler's dissent, however, was later accepted in the Samuels
decision. Samuels v. State, 267 Ind. at 679, 372 N.W.2d at 1187.
201. 267 Ind. at 92, 368 N.E.2d at 241.
202. See Samuels, 267 Ind. at 678, 372 N.E.2d at 1188. See also Flewallen, 267
Ind. at 97, 368 N.E.2d at 243 (DeBruler, J., dissenting). 267 Ind. at 97, 368 N.E.2d
at 243. DeBruler contrasted the situation of available witnesses in Fleuallen with the
facts in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1969). In Green the Court faced the alter-
native of either allowing out-of-court statements into evidence or completely losing
necessary relevant evidence. The Court in Creen held that the danger of losing such
statements warranted their admission. California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 158. DeBruler
distinguished Green from the facts in Fewalen by noting the lack of compelling necessity
for the statements in the latter case. 267 Ind. at 97, 368 N.E.2d at 243.
203. D.H. v. J.H., __ Ind. App. -, 418 N.E.2d 286 (1981) (prohibited the
out-of-court statement from being admitted into substantive evidence).
204. The court of appeals did not believe that the Patterson rule was as broad
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court before any extrajudicial statement may be introduced prevents
the substitution problem addressed in Samuels and ensures effective
cross-examination." 5 The opponent will be able to cross-examine the
declarant in close proximity to the declarant's in-court testimony. The
examiner will also be able to question the declarant in an adversarial
context in order to elicit the truth by pointing out weaknesses and
inconsistencies in the witness' testimony."0
The court of appeals has gone further than simply requiring the
declarant to testify in-court before the out-of-court statement may be
admitted into substantive evidence. In Carter v. State"7 the appellate
court held that the declarant must also have been cross-examined
before the prior statement qualifies for admission. This limitation on
the Patterson rule gives the opposing counsel some control over
whether an out-of-court statement will be admissible. 08 The require-
ment also eliminates the dangers inherent in improperly bolstering
the declarant's statement2" and prohibits repetitive testimony."' The
Supreme Court of Indiana has not yet ruled on these current Patter-
son rule prerequisites established by the appellate court.
Another important Patterson limitation introduced by the Indiana
Court of Appeals is that a declarant must be confronted with his out-
of-court statement and either affirm or deny that he made the state-
ment before it can be admitted into evidence.' The confrontation re-
quirement ensures that the declarant made the statement before it
is subsequently admitted. Without the confrontation requirement, a
declarant could testify on both direct and cross-examination and an
out-of-court statement could subsequently be introduced that contained
more details or was more prejudicial to the defendant than the in-
as indicated from its initial definition. Not only must the declarant be in court, he
must also testify and then be subject to cross-examination. Id. at -, 418 N.E.2d at 295.
205. See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
206. See also Carter v. State, - Ind. App. - 412 N.E.2d 825 (1980).
207. Id.
208. See infra notes 266-69 and accompanying text.
209. See infra notes 256-60 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
211. See Smith v. State, - Ind. App. -, 400 N.E.2d 1137 (1980), in which
the court of appeals held that it is important that the declarant does not deny making
the out-of-court statement. That court never required that the witness verify the state-
ment, only that he must not deny making it. Id. Carter and D.H. have interpreted
Smith as establishing a confrontation requirement whereby the out-of-court declarant
must specifically acknowledge or disavow making the prior statement. Carter at -,
412 N.E.2d at 829; D.H. at -, 418 N.E.2d at 295.
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court statement. If the declarant subsequently denied making the prior
statement or claimed a lack of memory about the details of the state-
ment, the opponent would be unduly prejudiced without an oppor-
tunity for effective cross-examination." ' Requiring the declarant to
verify or deny the statement prior to introducing the statement into
evidence eliminates unnecessary prejudice to the opposing party."'
An additional limitation placed upon the Patterson rule restricts
the admissible portion of the out-of-court statement to that part of
the statement available for effective cross-examination.' Smith v. State
involved a witness whose in-court testimony was consistent with only
a portion of her out-of-court statement. The out-of-court statement con-
sisted of the witness' statement and the statement of two others. The
Indiana Court of Appeals held that those portions of the out-of-court
statement made by persons who were not at the trial and not available
for cross-examination could not be admitted into evidence via the Pat-
terson rule. 5 The cross-examination of the in-court witness could not
ensure the reliability of those portions of the statement not made by
the in-court witness. Therefore, the appellate court set forth a re-
quirement that a prior recorded statement is not admissible in its
entirety if only a portion of the statement can be effectively
cross-examined. 6
The Supreme Court of Indiana has placed only one limitation
upon the Patterson rule since that rule was adopted. This limitation
prevents the substitution of out-of-court testimony for in-court
testimony.2 7 In contrast, the Indiana Court of Appeals has placed
several additional limitations upon Patterson. The appellate courts re-
quire that the out-of-court declarant testify in court,218 that a declarant
212. See supra notes 130-42 and accompanying text.
213. See Williams v. State, 269 Ind. 193, 379 N.E.2d 449 (1978) (Indiana Supreme
Court allowed the prosecution to admit prior statement and plea bargain even though
declarant did not verify that such statements were made). Williams conflicts with the
appellate court heldings in Carter and D.H.. Therefore, the confrontation requirement
is tenuous until the Indiana Supreme Court upholds its validity.
214. See Smith, __ Ind. App. at - , 400 N.E.2d at 1141 ("It does not necessari-
ly follow, however, that because [the witness] was present for cross-examination, the
whole of her prior statement was admissible as substantive evidence under Patterson.
This is because the statement contained statements by two other persons
..."). The court found the statements of the other persons to be outside of the Patter-
son rule because the declarants were not available for cross-examination. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See Samuels, 267 Ind. at 678, 372 N.E.2d at 1188.
218. See supra notes 189 and 204 and accompanying text.
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be confronted with his prior statement,"9 and that a declarant
remember making his out-of-court statement."m The appellate court
also requires court also requires that the declarant be cross-examined
before the out-of-court statement is introduced into evidence"1 and
that only that portion of the statement that is subject to effective
cross-examination may be admitted into evidence."22 Notwithstanding
the limitations placed upon the Patterson rule by Indiana's Supreme
Court and Appellate Courts, the rule continues to fail to ensure the
reliability of hearsay evidence.
B. The Patterson rule is not effective in preventing unreliable
hearsay statements from being used as substantive evidence.
The dangers of a liberal hearsay rule are evident from the ap-
plications of the Patterson rule. It is important to remember that the
acknowledged danger of hearsay is that the credibility of the declarant,
and therefore the reliability of the statement, are not adequately
safeguarded when the statement is made out-of-court.223 Therefore,
anytime the Patterson rule allows patently unreliable or traditionally
inadmissible statements into substantive evidence, it violates the hear-
say rule's purpose.
The Patterson rule has been used to admit prior statements into
substantive evidence even though the declarant denied the truth of
the statement. In Moten v. State,"' several witnesses gave statements
to the police after the event in question. Each witness admitted at
trial that he had made a prior statement but that the prior state-
ment was false. The witnesses did not testify about the content of
their out-of-court statements except to state that it was false "street
talk." They did not make in-court statements inconsistent with the
out-of-court statement but simply denied the truth of the prior
statements. The Supreme Court of Indiana allowed the refuted
statements in Moten to be introduced into substantive evidence. 5
219. Smith, __ Ind. App. at __, 400 N.E.2d at 1141.
220. Lloyd, 166 Ind. App. at 253, 335 N.E.2d at 237.
221. D.H., - Ind. App. at - 418 N.E.2d at 290.
222. Smith, __ Ind. App. at __ 400 N.E.2d at 1141.
223. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 281. See also Comment, supra note 94
and accompanying text.
224. 269 Ind. 309, 380 N.E.2d 544 (1978) (two witnesses who denied truth of
their earlier statements claimed they were threatened by police to make the statements).
225. See also Arch v. State, 269 Ind. 450, 381 N.E.2d 465 (1978). In Arch, the
declarant was a confederate of the defendant and had earlier plead guilty to a lesser
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The danger in admitting prior statements that have been
repudiated by the declarant is that there is not effective means of
cross-examining such a statement. A prior inconsistent statement can
be cross-examined in court at the same time the current in-court
testimony is given. The declarant is under oath when answering ques-
tions about both statements and the jury is able to view the declarant's
demeanor while qualifying or denying the prior inconsistent
statement."'6 In contrast, a refuted prior statement that is not accom-
panied by additional in-court testimony simply brings to the court
extrajudicial evidence that does not lend itself to any of the conven-
tional safeguards of reliability.227 The result is that unrestricted hear-
say is introduced into substantive evidence.
The Indiana Supreme Court cases of Moten v. State and Arch
v. State2 8 also present the problem of admitting prior out-of-court
statements made under influence or duress. In Moten, the witnesses
claimed they were threatened by police and gave the out-of-court
statements to avoid arrest. In Arch, the defendant argued that the
witness gave the prior statement in return for lenient treatment by
the prosecutor. The supreme court held in both cases that the Patter-
son rule allows such prior statements to be introduced into evidence
to prove the truth-of-the-facts asserted. The court held that the possi-
ble influence and duress involved with the statement will simply be
one factor among many that the jury will consider in determining
credibility.2" It is not certain the jury will possess sufficient informa-
tion to determine whether a statement was made voluntarily or in-
voluntarily unless that statement is made in the jury's presence.2"
offense. At the defendant's trial the declarant failed to recall the events in question.
The witness did not make a statement inconsistent with the prior statement but simply
disavowed the prior statement. The Indiana Supreme Court admitted the prior state-
ment, holding that the jury could evaluate both the prior statement and its repudia-
tion at the same time. Id.
226. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
227. If the prior statement was not made under oath, the demeanor of the
declarant when the prior statement was made cannot be observed by the jury and
the declarant's demeanor during repudiation is of little value. The opponent cannot
effectively cross-examine the witness because the witness has already repudiated the
statement that was harmful to the opponent. Therefore, the prior statement is admit-
ted without any safeguard for reliability.
228. See Arch, 269 Ind. at 454, 381 N.E.2d at 468. The Indiana Supreme Court
held that the fact the declarant was offered leniency in exchange for the statement
did not reflect upon the statement's reliability. The jury could still observe the witness'
demeanor and, therefore, was capable of weighing the truth of the statement. Id.
229. Id. See also Moten, 269 Ind. at 311, 380 N.E.2d at 546. Compare Stone v.
State, 268 Ind. 672, 377 N.E.2d 1372 (1978).
230. See Cook v. State, 269 Ind. 227, 379 N.E.2d 965 (1978). The declarant in
Cook was videotaped when the out-of-court statement was made. The court held that
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Observation of the witness' demeanor while testifying will greatly aid
the jury in determining whether duress or undue influence motivated
the witness' statement or if the witness made the statement of his
own accord. Therefore, the supreme court in Moten and Arch has
deprived the jury of an important opportunity to evaluate the reli-
ability of out-of-court statements.
Another serious Patterson rule problem demonstrated in Moten
involves the admission of prior out-of-court statements from a declarant
who, did not have first hand knowledge of the event which he is
describing. If a witness did not observe the occurrence himself he
cannot have first hand knowledge. First hand knowledge of the event
is essential to ensure the receipt of even minimally reliable
information.2 1 The requirement of first hand knowledge as a prere-
quisite for a witness' testimony on relevant material facts has been
established in various evidentiary rules.2 3' The first hand knowledge
requirement demonstrates a preference for at least minimally reliable
sources of evidence.' Nonetheless, Indiana has used the Patterson
rule to permit prior out-of-court statements into substantive evidence
notwithstanding that the statements were not based upon first hand
knowledge."
The supreme court circumvented the established first hand
the introduction of the videotape together with the testimony of the interrogating
detective gave the jury sufficient information upon which to determine the credibility
of the declarant and the reliability of the statement. Id.
231. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 20 ("One of the earliest and most per-
vasive manifestations of (the insistence upon the most reliable sources of information]
is the rule requiring that a witness who testifies to a fact which can be perceived
by the senses must have had an opportunity to observe, and must have actually observ-
ed the fact.").
232. See, e.g., UNIF. R. EVID. 19. The rule requires that the witness have first
hand knowledge of the event before the testimony of the witness may be introduced.
The judge may reject the testimony of the witness if he finds that a trier-of-fact would
not reasonably believe the witness perceived the event. "A witness may not testify
to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has
personal knowledge of the matter." FED. R. EVID. 602.
233. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 20.
234. See Moten, 269 Ind. at 311, 380 N.E.2d at 546 (two witnesses claimed that
their statements were based upon 'street talk' and not first hand knowledge). See also
Jordan v. State, Ind. -. 432 N.E.2d 9 (1982). Justice Prentice, author of the
Patterson rule, wrote a dissent to the Jordan court's admission of a conclusory out-of-
court statement. Id. at - . 432 N.E.2d at 14. The witness had no knowledge about
the robbery until she read about it in the newspaper. She then drew the conclusion
that the robbery described in the paper and the robbery mentioned by the defendant
were one in the same. Id. If the same witness had testified as to this conclusion in-
court, an objection relating to this testimony would have been sustained as the con-
clusion was a fact she surmised rather than one she witnessed.
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knowledge requirement when it allowed a witness to testify about
conjectured facts. In Jordan v. State,235 a witness had neither first
hand knowledge that the defendant had robbed the gasoline station
in question, nor knowledge as to whether the defendant had ever been
to that particular gasoline station.' However, based upon a newspaper
account of the robbery and the fact that the defendant told her that
he had been involved in a robbery, the witness concluded that the
defendant had robbed the particular gasoline station in question."'
The state introduced the witness' conjecture into evidence in the form
of a prior out-of-court statement by utilizing the Patterson rule.
The dissent in Jordan was written by Justice Prentice, the author
of the original Patterson opinion. Justice Prentice stated that the Pat-
terson rule, as applied in Jordan, allows an out-of-court statement in-
to evidence that would be an inadmissible conclusion of the witness
if made in-court. 8 Justice Prentice suggested limiting Patterson to
prevent this type of abuse.2 9 Furthermore, there are no adequate
means of effectively examining the reliability of testimony elicited from
a declarant who does not have first hand knowledge of the event in
question. The declarant can only be examined on his receipt of infor-
mation from another and his narrative ability.' Consequently, the jury
receives substantive testimony from the out-of-court declarant which
is not checked for even minimal reliability.24" '
The most recent abuse of the Patterson rule is found in cases
in which the declarant pleads the fifth amendment. In Rapier v. State,"2
the declarant repudiated the validity of the out-of-court statement,
235. Jordan, __ Ind. at __, 432 N.E.2d at 9.
236. Id. at - , 432 N.E.2d at 14.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See Beaver and Biggs, supra note 96.
241. See Bein, supra note 90 (when witness claims that he never had percep-
tual basis for statement, meaningful cross-examination is limited at best).
242. Rapier v. State, - Ind. , 435 N.E.2d 31 (1982). The witness in Rapier
admitted making the prior statement but refuted the statement while testifying in
court. When questioned further about the statement the witness relied upon his fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination and refused to testify any further. The
trial court allowed the witness' prior statement to be introduced into substantive
evidence using the Patterson rule to support its position. The Indiana Supreme Court
rejected the argument that the Patterson requirement of cross-examination was not
met. That court stated that the opponent never attempted to cross-examine the witness
after he claimed his fifth amendment rights. The court held that it was possible that
the witness may have changed his mind and testified on cross-examination about
something he would not testify about on direct-examination. Id. at -, 435 N.E.2d at 34.
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invoked his fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination, and
refused to testify any further. The supreme court admitted the refuted
prior statement into substantive evidence and cited the Patterson rule
as its authority.m It is logical that if a declarant pleads the fifth amend-
ment on direct examination, he will not want to subject himself to
potentially incriminating cross-examination which by its very nature
often seeks to discredit an opposing party's witness. In Rapier, the
Indiana Supreme Court required the opponent of an out-of-court state-
ment to demonstrate that effective cross-examination of the out-of-
court declarant was not possible.2 " Therefore, the supreme court im-
posed upon the cross-examiner the duty to call a declarant to the
witness stand even if the declarant has previously stated that he would
not testify.4 5
The Rapier case raises the question of whether other futile acts
must be performed by the cross-examiner before the court finds a
witness to be unavailable for cross-examination. If the witness pro-
fesses ignorance of the statement, as in Lamar-" the issue becomes
whether the cross-examiner must question the witness nonetheless
to demonstrate the witness has no memory. Similarly, must the cross-
examiner prove that the witness will not sufficiently answer the cross-
examination question before Carter"7 will bar the Patterson rule from
admitting the prior statement? Rapier creates an assumption that
there will be an opportunity for effective cross-examination if the
declarant is physically present in the courtroom. Rapier places the
burden upon the cross-examiner to prove effective cross-examination
is not possible. Rapier is an inconsistent prodigy of Patterson, in which
the court held that out-of-court statements were admissible into
evidence only after effective cross-examination of the witnesses."8
Rapier changes this Patterson rule requirement. Rapier allows extra-
judicial statements into substantive evidence unless the cross-examiner
can prove effective cross-examination is not possible. It is impractical
to place the burden upon the opponent to prove effective cross-
examination is impossible. This encumbrance allows unreliable hear-
say statements into substantive evidence before the opponent can meet
243. Id.
244. Id. In Rapier, the Supreme Court of Indiana stated that the declarant
may have changed his mind about not testifying. The court based its decision upon
the fact that opposing counsel did not attempt to cross-examine the defendant after
the fifth amendment privilege was invoked.
245. Id.
246. See Lamar, 266 Ind. at 702, 366 N.E.2d at 665.
247. Carter, - Ind. App. at _ 412 N.E.2d at 829.
248. Patterson, 263 Ind. at 57, 324 N.E.2d at 484.
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that burden. Therefore, the effect of Rapier is to permit more
unreliable statements into evidence than the hearsay rule was meant
to allow.249
The premise that effective cross-examination will ensure the
reliability of out-of-court statements, as stated in Patterson, has been
eroded in subsequent Indiana hearsay cases. The Patterson rule has
been used to allow out-of-court statements into substantive evidence
when the declarant repudiated the statement,2 " lacked first hand
knowledge"' and invoked the fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination." In these situations, effective cross-examination was
not available, yet the Patterson rule was used to allow the statements
into substantive evidence. The Patterson rule has also been applied
in spite of charges that the declarant was under undue influence and
duress to make the out-of-court statement.2" The Patterson rule has
been so liberally applied that it now allows unreliable statements in-
to evidence because there are situations, like those demonstrated
above, where there are no safeguards to ensure reliability. Not all
of the potential misapplications of the liberal Patterson rule have come
before the courts. The opportunity for new abuses of the rule will
probably be capitalized upon in future cases.
C. Potential dangers of the Patterson rule.
The problems created by the current Patterson rule are not
limited to the admission of unreliable extrajudicial statements into
substantive evidence."M The rule also opens the door to future im-
proper admissions of hearsay evidence. The Patterson rule does not
have any safeguards to prevent manufactured statements, irrelevant
statements, confused statements and numerous bolstering statements
from being introduced into substantive evidence. The rule allows the
proponent of a statement a great amount of discretion to use hearsay
statements without corresponding adequate safeguards to ensure state-
ment reliability.
The Patterson rule does not prevent self-serving manufactured
statements from being introduced as substantive evidence. 5 ' The
249. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 234-35 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 224-45 and accompanying text.
255. See Gooderson supra note 155. Gooderson contends that one of the major
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declarant who perceives that his in-court testimony may be weak or
ineffective is given an opportunity to bolster his own testimony
through the Patterson rule. The Patterson rule does not prevent a
declarant from making out-of-court statements prior to trial to people
who would make good witnesses in-court." The chosen listener may
be a policeman, a doctor, or any other reliable witness who would
create an aura of credibility when testifying about the prior state-
ment at trial. The declarant is therefore, able to create credible
witnesses who will support his in-court testimony. The Patterson rule
places no limitation on the number of new witnesses that can be
created. Therefore, the declarant is able to underscore his in-court
testimony without adding any evidence that materially increases his
reliability.
The consequence arising from a witness bolstering his own
testimony with numerous hearsay witnesses is that the jury may over-
value that evidence simply because it has been repeated many times.57
The Patterson rule permits essentially all prior out-of-court statements
to be used as substantive evidence as long as the declarant is available
for cross-examination.2" The jury is instructed to consider the out-of-
court statement as additional substantive evidence of the fact asserted.
This evidence is added to the declarant's in-court testimony and other
evidence introduced in the case to create the totality of evidence from
which the jury is to render its decision." 9 The Patterson rule permits
the same statement to be introduced into evidence a number of times,
skewing the evidentiary weight of the statement. There have been
no safeguards placed on the Patterson rule to prevent this overvalua-
tion of one declarant's statement.2®
purposes behind keeping prior statements out of substantive evidence is that such
statements may be specifically manufactured for evidentiary purposes.
256. See State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. at 362, 285 N.W. at 901. The Minnesota
Supreme Court held that unrestricted use of extrajudicial assertions would increase
temptation and opportunity for the manufacture of evidence.
257. See Travers, supra note 146, at 983. Travers discusses the problem of
juries that do not appreciate the fact that the prior consistent statement introduced
into evidence was made by the witness also testifying in court. He contends that there
is a strong possibility that the jury will over-value the out-of-court statement by con-
sidering it as additional new evidence.
258. See supra notes 224-45 and accompanying text.
259. See Travers, supra note 146, at 983.
260. See, e.g., Rapier v. State, __ Ind. - , 435 N.E.2d 31 (1982); Jordan v.
State __ Ind. -, 432 N.E.2d 9 (1982); D.H. v. J.H - Ind. App. -, 418 N.E.2d
286 (1981); Carter v. State, __ Ind. App. , 412 N.E.2d 825 (1980); Smith v. State,
- Ind. App. - , 400 N.E.2d 1137 (1980).
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Furthermore, the Patterson rule does not require that the out-
of-court statement be relevant to the case. 6' If the declarant has been
impeached on cross-examination as having a reputation for lying,
evidence that the declarant made the same statement numerous times
out-of-court is irrelevant to the declarant's reputation. The prior
statements only evade the impeachment issue. A statements accuracy
does not change because a declarant with a propensity to lie tells
the same story several times. Admitting into evidence an unreliable
declarant's out-of-court statements tends only to obscure the
declarant's bad reputation rather than rebut that reputation.
Therefore, the Patterson rule permits irrelevant out-of-court assertions
to be introduced in court with the result of confusing the jury about
the declarant's veracity.
The potential abuses of the Patterson rule are not limited to the
examples mentioned above. The situations described are only indicative
of how the Patterson rule can be utilized in the future. Manufactured
self-serving statements, repetitious and thus possibly over-valued
statements and irrelevant statements are permitted to be introduced
into substantive evidence due to the lack of sufficient limitations upon
the Patterson rule. These out-of-court statements do not assist the
jury in determining the truth and are highly prejudicial to the oppo-
nent. Nonetheless, the Patterson rule, as interpreted by the Indiana
Supreme Court, permits these out-of-court statements to be admitted
into substantive evidence notwithstanding their unreliability.
D. Other jurisdictions offer examples of new safeguards that
would ensure the reliability of out-of-court statements.
The problem of assuring prior consistent statements reliability
has been confronted by virtually every state that has abandoned the
traditional hearsay rule."' Most of these jurisdictions prohibit the in-
troduction of prior consistent statements into substantive evidence
until after the declarant has been cross-examined and only if the cross-
examiner attempts to impeach the witness-declarant.' This limitation
on the admission of prior statements prevents the declarant from
261. Id. Beginning with Patterson and continuing through all the subsequent
Indiana cases implementing the Patterson rule, relevancy has never been viewed as
a prerequisite to the admissibility of out-of-court statements. Patterson, 263 Ind. 55,
224 N.E.2d 482.
262. See supra note 43.
263. See FED. R. Evm. 801 (d)(1)(B). States which have provided such a restric-
tion on the admission of out-of-court assertions include California, Kansas, New Jersey,
New Mexico and Oregon. See supra note 5.
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bolstering his own testimony on direct examination. 2" The restriction
also prevents the out-of-court statement from being admitted when
the declarant invokes his fifth amendment rights and refuses to testify
at all. 25 Finally, the limitation gives the cross-examiner control over
the admission of extrajudicial statements introduced by the opposi-
tion because the cross-examiner must first impeach the declarant
before prior statements are admissible.' Therefore, the cross-examiner
can prevent the opposition from introducing manufactured,267
repetitious 28 and irrelevant 9 prior statements by simply electing not
to impeach the witness. A safeguard to prevent the admission of these
unreliable and unnecessary statements is thereby established.
States which have not adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence
but which allow prior consistent statements to be introduced into
substantive evidence have also created a number of restrictions upon
the admissibility of extrajudicial statements. Kansas has developed
a requirement that the out-of-court statement not be admissible as
substantive evidence unless the same statement would be admissible
if made by the declarant in court under direct examination.27 This
limitation prevents the out-of-court statement of a declarant without
first hand knowledge from being admitted into substantive evidence."7
It also ensures that only relevant prior statements will be introduced
into evidence.2"
264. The declarant cannot introduce the prior statement until after the cross-
examiner has met the FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(1)(B) requirement of impeaching the witness
by charging the declarant with improper motive or influence during the
cross-examination.
265. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
266. The cross-examiner may strategically choose not to impeach the opposing
witness in an effort to keep any prior out-of-court statements of that witness out of
substantive evidence.
267. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
270. See KAN. STAT. ANN. S 60-460 (1976) ("[A] statement which is made ... to
prove the truth of the matter stated is hearsay evidence and inadmissible except:
a) Previous statements of persons present . . . provided the statement would be ad-
missible if made by declarant while testifying as a witness.").
271. First hand knowledge is required in Kansas for all in-court testimony.
KAN. STAT. ANN. S 60-419 (1976). Therefore, S 60-460 places the requirement of first hand
knowledge upon out-of-court statements also. KAN. STAT. ANN. S 60-460 (1976). See also
supra notes 231-32.
272. Kansas also requires that only relevant in-court evidence may be admit-
ted into evidence. KAN. STAT. ANN. S 60-401 (1976); Williams v. Union Pac. R.R., 204 Kan.
772, 780, 465 P.2d 975. Therefore, S 60-460 requires that out-of-court statements must
be relevant before they will be admitted into substantive evidence.
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Another hearsay limitation initiated in Kansas is that the
declarant must testify on direct examination in court before the prior
out-of-court statement will be admitted to prove the truth-of-the-facts
asserted.7 This requirement ensures that the witness can be cross-
examined with leading questions and impeached, in addition to other
effective cross-examination techniques which would not be available
if the opponent initially had to call the witness to the stand.2 7' This
Kansas requirement has the same effect as the Samuels"5 decision
which prohibited out-of-court statements from being used as
substitutes for available in-court testimony.
In addition, Kansas precludes the admission of a statement made
in a deposition concerning a prior out-of-court statement unless the
declarant in the deposition was confronted with the out-of-court state-
ment during the deposition.27 A deposition is sometimes used as a
substitute for in-court testimony if the declarant is not available to
testify.277 The safeguard of cross-examination is available during the
taking of a deposition, and therefore, a deposition is admissible in
almost all non-traditional hearsay jurisdictions."8 The declarant's prior
out-of-court statement, however, is not subject to cross-examination
if the declarant is not available at trial and the declarant was never
confronted with the prior statement during the deposition. Therefore,
Kansas prohibits an untested prior deposition statement from being
admitted into substantive evidence.
Kentucky and Wisconsin have also abandoned the traditional
hearsay rule and consequently have created limitations on the ad-
missibility of out-of-court statements in order to ensure reliability.
Kentucky prevents prior statements from being introduced into
273. See State v. Fisher, 222 Kan. 76, 82, 563 P.2d 1012, 1017 (1977), in which
the state tendered proof that in-court statements of the witness would be contradic-
tory to prior out-of-court statements. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the out-
of-court statements should not have been admitted through the sheriffs deputies because
the witness was never actually called to the stand to testify. Id.
274. Id. The Supreme Court of Kansas required that the declarant testify prior
to the introduction of the prior statement, allowing the opponent to later effectively
cross-examine the witness with leading questions. See also supra notes 207-09 and
accompanying text.
275. See Samuels, 267 Ind. at 678, 372 N.E.2d at 1188.
276. See Thompson v. Norman, 198 Kan. 436, 441, 424 P.2d 593, 599 (1967). The
Supreme Court of Kansas interpreted S 60-460 (a) to prohibit a deposition from being
admitted into substantive evidence when the deponent was never confronted with the
out-of-court statement at the deposition. Id.
277. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 3-5.
278. See supra note 43.
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substantive evidence when the declarant refuses to answer only ques-
tions other than his name and address on direct examination. 9 This
limitation prevents decisions similar to Rapier, in which the out-of-
court statement was admitted into substantive evidence after the
declarant pleaded the fifth amendment.
Wisconsin has specifically restricted the use of an out-of-court
statement if the declarant does not have first hand knowledge of the
event.280 This requirement seems necessary to ensure the reliability
of in-court and out-of-court statements alike. However, Wisconsin is
the only non-traditional hearsay jurisdiction that has specifically
established the requirement of first hand knowledge for out-of-court
statements.
There appears to be a positive correlation between the length
of time a jurisdiction has gone without the traditional hearsay rule
and the number of specific limitations it places upon the admission
of out-of-court statements."' A logical reason for the correlation would
seem to be that experience elucidates additional dangers of liberal
hearsay rules. Therefore, those jurisdictions that have been liberal
in their admission of out-of-court statements for a considerable length
of time will have experienced a greater variety of situations in which
unreliable hearsay was allowed into evidence. Not suprisingly, those
liberal jurisdictions have instituted more limitations on hearsay
evidence in an attempt to remedy this problem.
279. See Phillips v. Commonwealth, - Ky. , 600 S.W.2d 485 (1980). The
witness in Phillips gave only his name and address upon direct-examination and then
refused to answer any further questions. The trial court held that this testimony was
sufficient to allow the defendant the availability of cross-examination; consequently,
the court admitted this witness' prior out-of-court statements into evidence. The Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals held that the out-of-court statements were inadmissible and
reversed the conviction. The appellate court held that a witness that refuses to answer
questions on direct examination is not available for cross-examination. Id. at -, 600
S.W.2d at 486.
280. See Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 230, 163 N.W.2d 609 (1969). When the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin discarded the traditional hearsay rule it established a
number of safeguards for the reliability of out-of-court statements. These safeguards
include: 1. first hand knowledge; 2. a requirement that the declarant acknowledge making
the prior statement, and 3. a requirement that the opponent be given an opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant. Id. at 614.
281. Kansas has followed non-traditional hearsay rules for over fifteen years
and has imposed a number of restrictions on out-of-court statements by statute and
case law. See supra note 276. Wisconsin abandoned the traditional hearsay rule four-
teen years ago and has implemented three primary prerequisites to the admission
of out-of-court hearsay. See supra note 280. Indiana parted with the traditional rule
eight years ago and its Supreme Court has created two safeguards to ensure the
reliability of out-of-court statement. See supra notes 16 and 113.
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The original Patterson rule has been restricted to some degree
by the Supreme Court of Indiana282 and more stringently limited by
the Indiana Court of Appeals.2" In spite of these limitations, the Pat-
terson rule has still been manipulated to permit the admission of
unreliable out-of-court statements into evidence to prove the truth-of-
the-facts asserted.2" Potential misapplications of the rule that have
not yet found their way into the courts create additional dangers of
unreliable substantive evidence.2" Other jurisdictions which have aban-
doned the traditional hearsay rule have combatted unreliable hear-
say evidence by placing numerous restrictions upon the admissibility
of out-of-court assertions.2" The problem faced by the non-traditional
hearsay jurisdictions is how to allow necessary, reliable hearsay
statements into substantive evidence while preventing the admission
of valueless and unreliable statements into evidence. One answer is
that these courts should balance the dangers and benefits of the hear-
say statement in each individual situation before deciding upon its
admission.
V. THE PATTERSON RULE CAN BE TRANSFORMED INTO AN
EFFECTIVE HEARSAY RULE
The Patterson rule can be made an effective instrument in
preventing unreliable extrajudicial statements from being admitted
into evidence while simultaneously permitting reliable, necessary hear-
say to be admitted as substantive evidence. The first new limitation
that should be placed upon the Patterson rule is that the out-of-court
statement sought to be admitted must be one that would be admissi-
ble if given in court287 and also admissible for a purpose other than
bolstering the declarant's testimony.2' This prerequisite will prevent
282. See Samuels, 267 Ind. at 678, 372 N.E.2d at 1188.
283. See supra notes 186-93 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 203-12
and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 224-54 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 255-60 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 262-80 and accompanying text.
287. See Karlson, Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Law-Evidence, 12
IND. L. REv. 192, 194 (1979) ("Limiting the Patterson rule to those situations in which the
statement is already admissible for some other purpose will lend support for eliminating
a party's use of carefully prepared extrajudicial statements."). See also State v. Saporen,
205 Minn. at 362, 285 N.W. at 901.
288. Without requiring prior statements to be admissible for purposes other
than corroborating in-court testimony, there is an incentive for the declarant to make
a consistent statement out-of-court that will later be used to bolster his in-court
testimony.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 [1984], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss2/8
PATTERSON RULE
irrelevant and immaterial statements that are not admissible in the
form of direct in-court testimony from being received as substantive
evidence through the Patterson rule.289 It will also restrict out-of-court
statements made by a declarant without firsthand knowledge.'
Firsthand knowledge is more reliable than second- or thirdhand in-
formation because the observer/declarant will have more information
about the circumstance and setting of the event than a non-observer."
The opponent also has a better opportunity to effectively cross-
examine a witness with firsthand knowledge because he can probe
the declarant's perception, memory and narrative abilities as they
relate to the event in question. 2
The admissibility limitation will also restrict the introduction of
manufactured extrajudicial statements by requiring that out-of-court
statements be admissible for a purpose other that to strengthen the
declarant's in-court statement. It will be much more difficult for a
declarant to manufacture out-of-court statements with probative value
in regards to an issue at trial, as opposed to using such statements
to merely bolster his in-court statements. This should curtail the in-
centive for the declarant to create witnesses because their testimony
will be merely cumulative and inadmissible."3 This requirement will
also screen out irrelevant hearsay that adds nothing of substantive
value to the case.
Another amendment to the Patterson rule should be that the
declarant must testify in court about the information included in the
out-of-court statement,"4 and acknowledge that the prior statement
was made before any out-of-court statements may be admitted. 5 This
requirement will enable the cross-examiner to question the declarant
in an adversarial manner in order to challenge inconsistancies and
weaknesses in both the in-court and out-of-court statements.' If the
declarant does not testify in court prior to the admission of the out-
289. See supra notes 255-60 and accompanying text.
290. See Jordan, __ Ind. at __, 432 N.E.2d at 14.
291. See State v. Fisher, 222 Kan. at 82, 563 P.2d at 1017.
292. See c. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 585.
293. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
295. See Falknor, supra note 131, at 159 ("[If the declarant] insists that he never
observed the event ... it is abundantly clear that in this situation cross-examination
of the witness, as a practical matter, is scarcely more aid in testing the dependability
of the alleged out-of-court statement than would be the cross-examination of A to test
the veracity of an alleged statement of B."). See also notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
296. See Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. at 113, 150 N.W.2d at 156.
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of-court statement, the opponent will have to call the declarant to
the stand to question him about the statement. The court could then
consider the declarant to be the opponent's witness, thus preventing
the opponent from using leading questions and from impeaching the
witness. The opponent, then, would not be able to effectively examine
the declarant whose prior out-of-court statement may be very pre-
judicial to the opponent's case. Similiarly, if the declarant does not
signify the truth or falsity of the out-of-court statement prior to its
admission, then on cross-examination the declarant may claim lack of
memory, duress, or even refute the statement. As a result, the cross-
examiner is not given an opportunity to challenge the statement's
substance because the declarant has not taken a position on the
statements truthfulness of trial. The facts underlying the statement
are, therefore, outside the scope of effective cross-examination. The
proposed requirement will remedy these problems by ensuring the
safeguard of effective cross-examination.
The final modification to the Patterson rule that should be made
is to expand the trial court's authority by encouraging judges to
balance the necessity for the prior statement against its probability
of unreliability and undue prejudice to the opposing party. The trial
judge should determine if the prior statement is essential to disclose
important facts to the jury or if the statement is merely corroborative
or bolstering in nature. If the statement is found to be introduced
primarily to bolster similar testimony, the judge may reject the state-
ment because its probative value is outweighed by its prejudice to
the defendant.' Whenever the trial judge believes that more infor-
mation in needed regarding the statement's benefits and harms before
admitting it, the judge should be allowed and encouraged to call a
conference outside the hearing of the jury to entertain arguments for
and against the statement's admission.'
Encouraging judicial scrutiny over those statements that meet
the newly proposed Patterson rule amendments' will give a trial court
the flexibility to prohibit parties from employing the rule to admit
297. See Gard, Survey of Kansas Law-Evidence, 12 KAN. L. REV. 239 (1963). Even
admissible hearsay may be given weight which it does not deserve, and thereby becom-
ing highly prejudicial. The trial judge may remedy this problem by invoking the 'best
evidence' rule and thereby limit bolstering evidence. Id. at 247.
298. See Note, Kansas District Court Rules-Anomalies of Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, 6 WASHBURN L. J. 113 (1966). Seven of the Kansas District Courts created rules
requiring a pre-trial conference when prior outof-court statements were to be introduced
into evidence. These courts could determine in advance whether the value of the hearsay
outweighed its prejudice. Id. at 120.
299. See supra notes 287-96 and accompanying text.
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non-probative or unreliable evidence. A trial court is in a position to
determine the effect the hearsay statement will have in the case at
bar. Therefore, that court should be given the responsibility and
authority to balance the benefits of otherwise admissible out-of-court
statements against their harmful effects and exclude such statements
when their unreliability, lack of necessity, and prejudice to the defen-
dant are very high. The Supreme Court of Indiana should formulate
the precise standards to be used in this balancing test' 0
The underlying policy for requiring prerequisites and other
safeguards to the Patterson rule is to improve the reliability of hear-
say evidence.31 Without these restrictions, the Patterson rule has allow-
ed unreliable out-of-court statements into evidence that could not be
effectively cross-examined. 2 Patterson has permitted statements that
are inadmissible on direct examination to be admitted into substan-
tive evidence because they were in a hearsay form.311 In addition, the
Patterson rule tolerates the admission of manufactured statements that
severly prejudice the defendant even though they do not add any ad-
ditional substantive evidence to the case.30 ' The problems created by
the Patterson rule can be remedied by adding prerequisites that must
be met before the rule may be utilized. The result would be a Patter-
son rule that permits reliable and valuable consistent out-of-court
statements into substantive evidence while safeguarding against the
inherent dangers of hearsay.25
VI CONCLUSION.
The Patterson rule marks Indiana's break with the traditional
hearsay rule it adhered to for many years. The difficulty with im-
plementing a liberal hearsay rule like Patterson is that the primary
safeguard of reliability, i.e., cross-examination, is often sidestepped
300. Indiana does not have statutory evidentiary rules and, therefore, the
Supreme Court of Indiana is the official source of new evidentiary rules. Whether
statutory rules of evidence would be preferable to Indiana's existing common law system
is beyond the scope of this note.
301. See supra notes 223-61 and accompanying text.
302. See, e.g., Rapier, - Ind. at __, 435 N.E.2d at 35; Arch, 269 Ind. at
454, 381 N.E.2d at 468; Moten, 269 Ind. at 311, 380 N.E.2d at 546; Williams, 269 Ind.
at 196, 379 N.E.2d at 453.
303. See Jordan v. State, - Ind. at , 432 N.E.2d at 14.
304. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 43. The new Patterson rule would remedy the hearsay
dangers that caused the English Courts of the early 1700's to prohibit the admission
of out-of-court statements.
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by introducing statements that are not amenable to effective
cross-examination.0 6 Consequently, these statements are allowed into
evidence without any safeguard of reliability. The liberal Patterson
rule also allows statements into evidence which are not probative to
the case and which are extremely prejudicial to the opposing party.
The problem is most appropriately viewed as how to prevent these
hearsay dangers and still permit reliable, vital hearsay into evidence.
The solution to these problems is to limit the Patterson rule in
those situations where cross-examination is not an effective safeguard
and prohibit its use when the value of the hearsay evidence is
outweighed by its prejudicial harm. Another safeguard of reliability
is to allow the trial courts to restrict hearsay evidence that meets
the improved Patterson rule requirements but is nevertheless too
unreliable or too prejudicial to be admitted. The more restrictive Pat-
terson rule proposed would create at least one reliability safeguard
on all consistent out-of-court statements. Such a standard would be
one more safeguard of reliability than the Patterson rule currently
imposes on out-of-court statements.
TERRY L. ZABEL
306. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
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